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ABSTRACT 
 
TECHNOLOGICAL TRANSFORMATION OF  
THE PERCEPTION OF DEATH 
 
Akku%, Murat Baran 
M.A.,Department of Communication and Design 
Supervisor: Assist.Prof.Dr. Ahmet Gürata 
January 2013 
 
 
The historical attitudes toward death are compared with the philosophical tradition 
of death contemplation to suggest points of divergence and similarities on the notion 
of the death of the body. Technological transformations of the attitudes toward body 
that are established through new modes of perception are often confined into the 
narrow understanding of Cartesian philosophy. Merleau-Ponty’s notion of flesh 
overcomes the dualistic consequences of the representational theory of perception 
thus offering a unified understanding to the elementary relation of bodies to their 
world. Death must be understood in this bodily sense of Being on which the 
technological makeup of the daily life plays a crucial and transformative role. The 
changes in the tradition of Vanitas and the technological penetration of body in 
Cronenberg’s cinema are prime expressions of bodily death. Merleau-Ponty’s 
phenomenology and textual and visual expressions of encounters with technology 
and nature are used in order to propose a transformative project to re-establish a 
primal relation with the intertwinings of death and life. 
 
Keywords: Death, Body, Flesh, Technology, Phenomenology 
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ÖZET 
 
 
ÖLÜM ALGISININ TEKNOLOJ!K BA#KALA#IMI 
 
Akku%, Murat Baran 
Yüksek Lisans, !leti%im ve Tasarım Bölümü 
Tez Yöneticisi: Yrd. Doç. Dr. Ahmet Gürata 
Ocak 2013 
 
 
Ölüme yönelik tarihsel tutumlar, felsefenin ba%langıcından beri süregelen ölüm 
üzerine dü%ünme gelene"iyle kar%ıla%tırılmı% ve bedenin ölümü fikriyle olan 
benzerlikler ve farklılıklar ortaya atılmı%tır. Yeni görme biçimleriyle %ekillenen 
bedene yönelik tutumların teknolojik ba%kala%ımları, sıklıkla Kartezyen felsefenin 
dar anlayı%ına sıkı%tırılmı%tır. Merleau-Ponty’nin dünyanın bedenselli"i kavramı 
temsilsel algı kuramının ikicil sonuçlarını a%arak, bedenlerin dünyalarıyla olan ilkel 
ili%kisine birle%ik bir anlayı% sunar. Ölüm, Olu%un bu bedensel anlamında anla%ılmalı 
ve günlük hayatın teknolojik karakterinin ölüme yakla%ımın belirleni%inde oynadı"ı 
kritik ve ba%kala%tırıcı rol bu çerçevede de"erlendirilmelidir. Vanitas gelene"indeki 
de"i%imler ve Cronenberg sinemasında bedene teknolojinin nüfuzu böylesine bir 
bedensel ölümün temel dı%avurumlarındandır. Merleau-Ponty’nin görüngübilimi ve 
teknoloji ve do"ayla kar%ıla%maların metinsel ve görsel dı%avurumları, ölüm ve 
hayatın iç içe geçmi%li"iyle ilkel bir ili%kiyi yeniden kurabilecek ba%kala%ımsal bir 
projeyi önermek üzere kullanılmı%tır. 
 
Anahtar Kelimeler: Ölüm, Beden, Dünyanın Bedenselli"i, Teknoloji, 
Görüngübilim 
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CHAPTER 1 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
 
 
No amount of preparation can prepare one for the death of the other. That tearing in 
the fabric of normalcy, the passing of a life full of voice, memories, of love for the 
other beings or even for the world itself, of knowledge amassed and made use of, of 
things changed and the world seen. The end of a singular thing that perceived the 
universe, that experienced its joy and its pain; now lost to the World, to the others 
and to itself but somehow still lingering, as a collection of bones and flesh that 
returns to the world once more but also retained in the memories of the other, as a 
ghostly presence that still occupies the inner life of another person that somehow 
overlapped with his own, still touching the other somehow as a phantom. In the 
passing of the Other, there is the recognition of one’s own passing away. It can be 
asked: Will they mourn for me? Will they remember me? It is somehow important 
that we are mourned, that we exist in the memories of the others. As if we are 
already anticipating our ghostly existence. Is it the same drive in us that propels us to 
make signs? To leave traces in words, in images, in narratives of our own making? 
Or is it our basic participation in the presence of the world, lamenting those who 
passed as well as our own demise in their eyes: for my perception in my offspring, in 
  
 
2 
the eyes of the other is going to fade as well; but also looking forward to a life 
beyond the loss, beyond the pain. Why do we cry if not for expressing that pain? 
Even in pain, the life itself screams with all its nerves, still wishes for a painless, 
easy transition and even for eternity still, even in that uninvited, horrible fact of death 
present in the room, even in that period of mourning where you may be entirely 
numb with your careless indifference to life, something aches and claws for air. How 
horrible it is to have to carry that pain of the lost one. There are choices to be made 
when the death of another is encountered, for example in the way that loss is carried 
within or the many paths of dealing with the truth of mortality that becomes evident 
in the death of the other. That loss may be carried in many ways: with dignity, with 
deep overwhelming sadness, with wide-eyed anticipation of life, with flesh tearing 
frenzy, with emotional barrenness or with willful ignorance of death. For too easily 
we are reminded of death: of pain past and of pain to come, of the absence of past 
ones and always on the horizon absence of our own: the cruel, objective knowledge 
of mortality of life. 
 
This thesis begins with that encounter with the death of the other and attempts to 
grasp that encounter within the life of those who are thoroughly engaged with 
technology. While this does not mean that a familiarity with a certain technology is 
required to grasp the ideas behind this particular text, the ideas within should be 
applicable only for those who acknowledge a level of immersion in technology. One 
example to this is the amount of time spent looking at a screen and the experience of 
this perception. Rather than glossing over this perception, this thesis grounds its 
ideas in that experience of looking. This engagement with technology, in order to be 
understood, must first be acknowledged through awareness. The ways of engaging 
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with the devices that populate the world can be brought to view by expression. 
Through a transformed awareness of the technological components of daily life, the 
daily engagements with the events of life can be expressed as they are lived. In this 
sense, this thesis will be focused on one particular event: death. 
 
It must be acknowledged beforehand that an encounter with death is fleeting and 
momentary compared with the amount of engagement with technology. Yet it must 
also be acknowledged that that encounter with death cannot be considered in 
isolation, without considering the attitudes toward dying, the variety of 
representations of death that comes before or after the encounter with death, without 
thinking about the experience of the daily life. It is within this context of daily 
experience that brushes with death, be it through the dying bodies of animals or the 
images of death that are perceived on the surfaces of screens, will be evaluated. 
 
In order to attain this awareness, this thesis uses Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenology as 
its main theoretical component. Merleau-Ponty’s philosophy attempts to ground the 
experience of the world through the phenomenological expression of the human 
being’s life. According to Merleau-Ponty, the world opens up to perception at the 
nexus of the active participation of perception; the permanent perspective of body; 
the objects and the environment that is revealed and met through perception; the 
invisible interweaving of language and culture; and the other bodies that exist in a 
web of intersubjectivity. His philosophy is able to include within it the social and 
linguistic structures as well as the biological, physical existence of the individual.  In 
other words, Merleau-Ponty brings forth the daily experience of life through his 
focus on the awareness of the world through perception. It is in this sense that 
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technology can take up its place in daily life: through perception. It is also in this 
sense that death is encountered: through perception. Thus in this field of perception 
that incorporates within itself, say, the structures of language and the flesh of the 
body, death and technology is brought together and revealed as intertwined. For this 
thesis, Merleau-Ponty’s philosophy provided the perceptional field on which 
attitudes toward death can be shown to have been transformed alongside the 
technological transformation of the daily life. As such, this thesis can be considered 
as a discussion that attempts to reveal the relation between death and technology on 
the perceptional field that is offered by Merleau-Ponty’s philosophy. 
 
In Chapter 2, two names are introduced that are central to the beginning of this 
discussion. First is Philippe Ariès. Ariès, in his book The Hour of Our Death (2008) 
examines the ancient tradition of death and compares it with the attitudes that he 
observes in the industrialized areas of Western World. He calls the ancient tradition 
the tame death on account for the attitudes that were prevalent. These attitudes, 
compared with the current attitudes show that death was considered more to be a part 
of the daily life. It was met, not individually, but with a community. It was not 
considered to be nothingness, but more of a continuation of life itself. Compared to 
tame death, this untame and invisible death is a new phenomenon that is particular to 
the technologically advanced culture of the west.  Ariès traces the first instances of 
the attitudes toward death that are distinct from the traditional attitudes, to the 
beginning of the 19th century and to the introduction of medicalization, thus 
providing the thesis with the first instance of the relation between technology and the 
attitudes toward dying. 
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The second name is Socrates who argued for death contemplation as a particularly 
philosophical endeavor. His thrust with this argument was that the philosopher, by 
pursuing the ideals of wisdom, would not be afraid of death since contemplation of 
death would reveal death as not something to be afraid of but at the very worst, as 
something that can simply be not known. While contemplation of death is in itself an 
important tradition for philosophy, Socrates opposes death contemplation to the 
worldly pursuits such as pleasure or wealth. Of particular importance for the 
purposes of this discussion are his warnings against indulgences in bodily matters. 
While this warning will be discussed in more detail within the thesis, this instance 
provides the thesis with the first relation between death and body. It is not a 
coincidence that the idea of a body that dies is encountered in the beginnings of 
Western Philosophy, within the discussion of the issue of facing death. 
 
Chapter 3 focuses on the body and its significance in life. Schopenhauer, also 
belonging to the tradition of death contemplation, is the first philosopher that 
opposes the Cartesian tradition that more or less defines modern philosophy, on the 
issue of the body. While Descartes considers body to be not much more than a 
machine, Schopenhauer realizes that the existence of body is different than the 
existence of other objects. Schopenhauer’s philosophy, similar to Socrates, advices 
death contemplation in opposition to the indulgence in the bodily pursuits. On the 
other hand, Merleau-Ponty’s philosophy focuses on the bodily existence of the 
human being, bringing forth the daily experience of the world without the moral 
message against the body. He reveals the visceral aspect of being through his 
philosophy. In this chapter, the idea that death is the death of the body will be 
discussed by using Merleau-Ponty’s concept of flesh, which is used to express the 
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primal belongingness of the human being to the world. At the end of these two 
chapters, both death and body have been brought together under the folds of the 
phenomenological expression, thus putting the idea of the body-that-dies under the 
light of a single system of thought. This idea cannot be delineated since upon doing 
so, the intertwining of body and death, of life and death, would be separated and its 
significance would be distorted. In order to properly deal with this idea, expression 
rather than definition is required. That is why Merleau-Ponty’s philosophy is crucial 
for the purposes of this thesis. 
 
Chapter 4, first, considers the Vanitas tradition and discusses the changes in this 
tradition through Richard Leppert’s The Art and The Committed Eye (1996). Leppert 
observes that with the rise of medical technologies, coinciding with the pushing of 
death out of the social life, the Vanitas tradition forsook the horrible image of the 
decomposing flesh in favor of the anatomical image of the skull. The tradition also 
began focusing on the luxuries and pleasures and contradicted the message of 
Vanitas which is, similar to Schopenhauer, a renunciation of earthly pleasures. The 
expression of death, even in the dogmatically ordered symbolism of this tradition, 
was subjected to changes that were brought on by technology. Also discussed within 
this chapter is Cronenberg’s cinema for its extraordinary success in expressing the 
depth of the changes that is brought about by technology while also pointing out the 
many paths of transgressions and resistances that the body offers. For as Merleau-
Ponty’s philosophy is a visceral philosophy, Cronenberg’s cinema is a visceral 
cinema. The goal of this chapter is to present body and its death as transformed by 
technology. Merleau-Ponty’s philosophy offers the background for this expression 
through which the understanding of the death of the body is shaped through the 
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pervasiveness of technology. Whenever technology is mentioned in this thesis, it has 
to be understood as an increasingly pervasive perspective that threatens to replace all 
other ways of seeing in favor of this one ordered, efficient and new kind of seeing. It 
is not the case that technology is solely responsible for perception nor it is the case 
that all other perspectives are already lost. Life encompasses technology and as will 
be seen throughout the thesis, the precondition for the immersion in technology is 
body itself. This thesis attempts to situate the changing attitudes toward death in this 
particular perspective’s increasing presence in the lives of those who are frequently 
engaged with these technologies. It must be acknowledged that the strategy of this 
thesis is not to reduce this perspective to one single technology, although examples 
will be given in Chapter 4 such as gamification and quantification. 
 
In the conclusion, another path towards reclaiming the place of death in one’s life 
will be pointed out. This path considers life and death as already intertwined. As 
neither life nor death can be defined by themselves or known by themselves, in order 
to form an attitude towards death one must also consider life in all its forms. It is my 
belief that life is already intertwined with death and without an understanding of the 
human being’s elementary belongingness to the Earth and to every living thing on 
this planet, any philosophy of life would be lacking. In this sense, one’s own 
engagement with technology must also be understood within this belongingness, thus 
neither considering technology as solely responsible for the daily experience of the 
world, nor abandoning the increasing need for the awareness of the pervasiveness of 
this new perspective.  
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CHAPTER 2 
 
 
DEATH 
 
 
 
2.1 Tame Death 
 
In what shape, form, word or image has the idea of death emerged for the human 
animal? Did he see his own death in the carcasses of animals or his fellow 
tribesman? Did he look into the darkness of the night and considered it as his future, 
a time that he would have to necessarily leave the relative protection of his group and 
venture into the vast unknown? It surely must have meant something that the other 
human beings stopped being there, stopped responding to sounds, stopped producing 
sounds and most importantly stopped moving. If an organism that depends on 
movement to survive becomes immobile, his inactivity must have surprised and even 
terrified.  
 
Human beings know that they are going to die. No one would deny that a time would 
come for all when life as one knows will end. This life that is lived is limited. The 
phenomenon of death is more perplexing since there is no fixed time for death. It is 
not the case that one is given a date of his death and consider it in relation to that 
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particular time. In addition to knowing that life is finite; human beings also know 
that life can finish at any given moment, without any warning. No amount of 
guessing, clairvoyance or even scientific observation can provide any consoling 
piece of information, if any information about death can be consoling at all. The 
simple and terrible truth is that death is inevitable and it cannot be foretold.  
 
This was not always so. As with all such seemingly timeless and objective truths, 
when the human perspective on most phenomena is considered, the historical context 
complicates and most of the time undermines convictions. Ariès writes in his book 
The Hour of Our Death (2008) that the oldest and relatively speaking, the most 
natural death was a death that was often foretold. In the literature of  Middle Ages he 
finds this ancient attitude towards death which goes back to the beginnings of 
history. The characteristics of this old attitude are what he uses as a frame in which 
he compares the changes throughout history in the attitudes towards death.  
 
This miraculous quality, the legacy of times when there was no clear boundary 
between the natural and the supernatural, has prevented romantic observes from 
seeing the very positive quality of the premonition of death and the way in which it 
is deeply rooted in daily life. The fact that death made itself known in advance was 
an absolutely natural phenomenon, even when it was accompanied by wonders 
(Ariès, 2008: 8). 
 
The accidental and sudden death was considered unnatural and disturbing in contrast 
to the contemporary attitude: “In this world that was so familiar with death, a sudden 
death was a vile and ugly death; it was frightening; it seemed a strange and 
monstrous thing that nobody dared talk about” (Ariès, 2008: 11). 
 
Aries finds instances of this attitude, which he calls tame death, from Homer to 
Tolstoy. For two thousand years the traditional attitude towards death remains 
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unchanged, only to begin disappearing rapidly in the last century. Although this 
radical change and its causes and consequences will be reevaluated further along, it 
is appropriate now to say that the relative naturalness of tame death carries more ties 
with what cannot be properly imagined: the deaths of human ancestors that are 
forever lost and only reemerge partially in cave paintings and stone tools. One very 
important aspect of tame death is its communal nature. In the tame death: 
Death is not a purely individual act, any more than life is. Like every great 
milestone in life, death is celebrated by a ceremony…whose purpose is to express 
the individual’s solidarity with his family and community…Thus death was not a 
personal drama but an ordeal for the community, which was responsible for 
maintaining the continuity of the race. (Ariès, 2008: 603) 
 
Here Ariès points out that death is an attack on the defenses of the community 
against nature thus casting the attitudes that are involved in tame death along a 
continuation of reactions against death that goes back farther in time. The communal 
aspect of tame death, which the rituals surrounding the death bed are one prime 
example, invokes the groups that are formed in order to hunt and provide better 
protection against predators. While any conjectures as to this relation would be 
highly speculative, the similarities are there. It may be possible to argue that 
reactions of hunter groups or groups that were continuously under the threat of 
nature, were communal reactions. The death of one member affected all the other 
members. These effects were immediate and were directly related to the survival 
chances of the species. Thus the communal aspect of tame death may be considered 
as a reaction that was natural in more than one ways.  
 
Another aspect of tame death, one is lost today, is a simple resignation to it and 
acceptance of it as a continuation of life. One of Ariès’s examples is illuminating in 
order to understand this difference. It is from Paul Bourget’s Outre-Mer. Bourget 
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travels to the United States in 1890 and witnesses the hanging of a young black man, 
the servant of an ex-colonel.  He eats fried fish with relish and later wears the new 
shirt that he is handed, “the uniform of execution” and his courage while doing these 
surprises Bourget. Later the ex-colonel, to prepare his former servant to death, kneels 
with him and they pray together. 
Bourget makes this comment on the scene: “The physical and almost animal 
courage [he does not understand the immemorial resignation in the face of 
death] that he had shown by eating with such a hearty appetite was suddenly 
ennobled by a touch of the ideal.” Bourget does not realize that there is no 
difference between the two attitudes that he contrasts. He was expecting 
either rebellion or a big emotional scene, but what he observes is 
indifference. “I thought about the amazing indifference with which this half-
breed let go of life, a life that he cared about, since he was sensual and 
vigorous. I said to myself, ‘What an irony that a man of this sort…should 
instinctively arrive at what philosophy regards as the ultimate goal of its 
teaching: resignation to the inevitable’.” (Ariès, 2008: 27-28) 
 
Even at the end of 19th century, it is clear that this attitude was a rare thing, 
something that is lost and difficult to comprehend. Bourget’s account thus becomes 
an encounter with a past and an attitude towards death that seems to be out of reach 
for the contemporary mind. If the history of tame death is considered, that Ariès 
traces throughout the two thousand years of western attitudes toward death, the 
surprise of Bourget becomes itself the surprising reaction. The sudden disappearance 
of tame death represents a radical break with the tradition. Therefore the reaction of 
Bourget is the reaction of one who has already forgotten the ancient ways of dying. 
 
2.2. Socrates’s Death 
 
Another man who faced up to his death with dignity and calm comes to mind. 
Socrates is the model philosopher on which the relation of death and philosophy is 
first established. When Bourget talks about the ultimate goal of philosophy, he is 
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acknowledging this fact of the history of philosophy and its relation with the 
contemplation of death. The story of Socrates’s trial and execution is crucial. In his 
defense against the accusations of atheism and corruption of youth, Socrates does not 
weep, beg or try to haggle with the jury for a different verdict. In his usual ironic 
manner, Socrates keeps his calm in the face of death and explains why he is not 
afraid of the jury’s decision even if it is a decision of execution: 
To fear death, gentlemen, is no other than to think oneself wise when one is not, to 
think one knows what one does not know. No one knows whether death may not be 
the greatest blessings for a man, yet men fear it as if they know that it is the 
greatest of evils. And surely it is the most blameworthy ignorance to believe that 
one knows what one does not know (Plato, 2012: 33). 
 
He offers two possibilities on Apology (Plato, 2012) two perspectives on death. He 
argues that either death is a nothingness, a sleeping state (albeit a dreamless one) 
which, as all experience it constantly and is never harmed by it, should not be feared. 
What pleasant prospect exists than a constant blissful sleep?1 The second possibility 
is a kind of afterlife. Socrates offers his own version of afterlife where he meets up 
with all the wise men of the past, still able to continue his pursuit of wisdom among 
all those famous dead such as Homer or Orpheus. It is needless to point out the 
similarities between all ideas of afterlife and Socrates’s version. 
 
Both arguments still appear as if they seem to be all that can be thought about death. 
Either we carry on in a transformed state, for death surely have to change something 
or we cease to exist, which practically means the end of perception. What else is 
                                                
1 Death as sleep is not particular to Socrates’s philosophy. Ariès (Ariès 2008) points out that the idea 
of death as a sleeping state is one of the most ancient and popular images of death. It still persists 
today in many religious beliefs. It even finds its place in the recently science-fictional and presently 
applicable practice of cryonics, the preservation of the dead in a frozen state. Several cryonics 
organizations exist today, dating back half a century, proposing life extension services. The hope here, 
and it is no more than hope since the technology to revive the dead still does not exist, is to be 
awakened when a certain threshold of scientific breakthroughs are reached. People who are laid to 
their frozen state will be brought back to life and, presumably, will feel like they have slept a good 
night’s sleep. 
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there to seriously think about? Can there be a third possibility where something 
survives death yet is not you? Or a joining up to a metaphysical unity where again 
your identity, personality or past is left behind or merged with something that is 
beyond comprehension? A reincarnation which you cannot recall but only exists as a 
principle? These additions, in the end, amount to a loss that means, yet again, the 
death of you which renders them pointless. The consoling argument, which is the 
second possibility that is offered by Socrates, is all that matters: the survival of what 
makes you yourself, as a person, an individual with a past, with projects and 
emotions. If these are lost, then it is the death of you. 
 
These possibilities, aside from their own validity, are also important in a pragmatic 
sense. In Phaedo (Plato, 2005), which belongs to the middle-period of Plato’s 
writings and is considered as the beginning of the emergence of his own philosophy, 
the last scene of Socrates’s trial and execution is arrived at. Socrates’s friends come 
to visit him in prison and they spend his last hours in the shadow of death, upon the 
insistence of Socrates, conversing about the soul and arguing about its immortality. 
Before moving on to questioning what death is and what may be proposed as 
knowledge about it is true or not, Socrates offers one of the most important projects 
for philosophy: 
Other people are likely not to be aware that those who pursue philosophy aright 
study nothing but dying and being dead. Now if this is true, it would be absurd to 
be eager for nothing but this all their lives, and then to be troubled when that came 
for which they had all along been eagerly practicing (Plato, 2005: 223). 
 
Upon hearing this Simmias unintentionally laughs and points out that if the multitude 
heard Socrates they would think that philosophers desire death and they surely 
deserve it for doing so. Socrates’s answer to this is essential: “And they would be 
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speaking the truth, Simmias, except in the matter of knowing very well. For they do 
not know in what way the real philosophers desire death, nor in what way they 
deserve death, nor what kind of a death it is” (Plato, 2005: 223).  
 
The idea that there are kinds of death and not a single objective event or process is 
striking. With this idea the pragmatic considerations that have been briefly 
mentioned is made apparent. All the arguments that will come after this in Phaedo 
and all the teachings of Socrates that can be learned through Plato is cast anew as the 
practice of a particular way to die. 
 
Immediately after answering Simmias, Socrates offers a definition of death: “We 
believe, do we not, that death is the separation of the soul from the body, and that the 
state of being dead is the state in which the body is separated from the soul and exists 
alone by itself and the soul is separated from the body and exists alone by itself? Is 
death anything other than this?” The answer is no. The separation of the soul from 
the body is important in order to understand the kind of dying that Socrates has in 
mind. Socrates emphasizes a simple fact which will be taken up later: it is the body 
that dies. The soul, even if it is not immortal, and he makes it known that he is not 
completely positive that it is immortal, is able to attain actual truths. Truths that the 
soul can obtain are contrasted with the pseudo-knowledge that one arrives at through 
senses. So even though the soul may perish (although it is unlikely according to 
Socrates), the truths themselves that the soul strive to gain and this struggle itself 
allows one to approach the question of immortality and the problem of his death with 
courage. 
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Socrates, even at his last hours, becomes a remarkable model for his friends that 
surround him. He never loses his passion for wisdom, nor does he succumb to 
morbid ruminations. Leaving aside the arguments for immortality, which belong to 
Plato’s own philosophy anyway, the reasoning is that the philosopher should not be 
afraid of death because he should not have much to do with the worldly pursuits of 
wealth or pleasure. On the contrary, the true philosopher is the one who is in the 
Godly pursuit of wisdom. Therefore he does not care what he wears, what he earns, 
his title or his looks. He cares about wisdom, truth, courage and goodness and in the 
reflection of these ideals. Turning back to the possibilities of death as sleep and 
afterlife and considering them in this pragmatic sense, these are not only arguments 
about the nature of death but also instances of preparation, of dealing with one’s own 
mortality, of elevating one’s soul so that he can face his end with dignity, courage 
and with all the virtues of a philosopher. What prepares the philosopher is not only 
the excellence of his argumentations, their soundness and rationality, but also the 
very action of reflection on the issue of death. Thus both argumentation and 
contemplation allows the philosopher to leave behind his bodily attachments so that 
he can fully commit himself to his love of wisdom. 
 
When one studies the teachings of Socrates and comes upon his warnings against 
indulgence in the worldly matters such as pleasure and wealth, they may come off as 
idealistic and a bit out of touch with reality. How to take such expressions without 
considering them as a rejection of body: 
Now, how about the acquirement of pure knowledge? Is the body a hindrance or 
not, if it is made to share in the search for wisdom? What I mean is this: Have the 
sight and hearing of men any truth in them, or is it true, as the poets are always 
telling us, that we neither hear nor see any thing accurately? And yet if these two 
physical senses are not accurate or exact, the rest are not likely to be, for they are 
inferior to these. Do you not think so?” 
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           “Certainly I do,” he replied. 
           “Then,” said he, “when does the soul attain to truth? For when it tries to 
consider anything in company with the body, it is evidently deceived by it…” 
(Plato, 2005: 227) 
 
Still, this judgment would be too hasty because when Socrates talks about body, he 
does not use it in the sense that say, Descartes would. He does not put forth a soul 
and body distinction that reduces the body into a thing. Raj Singh (2007: 3) explains 
this excellently: 
The “body” here should be understood in its broader context, as representing the 
worldly involvements of the human being realized through human senses. It is 
suggested that for the most part, man’s soul is in bondage when it is absorbed in 
mundane concerns. The task of philosophy is to obtain the release of the soul from 
the concerns of the sense-world, for it is only in this freedom of thought that a 
deeper and fundamental (that is, ontological) knowledge can be gained. It is this 
death of the body, that is, death of one’s absorption in worldly concerns, that he 
prescribes for the philosopher. 
 
For Socrates, philosophy is a way of living and living excellently. Discussion of 
virtues, the good way to live is incomplete without reflection on death: the truth of 
existence that all humans are mortal. Instead of a complete rejection of body, there is 
instead a philosophical path that leads to a balanced life which does not shy away 
from bodily pursuits, yet is in control of these urges and instincts. Instead of being 
ruled by the body, the body is ruled, tempered and incorporated into the being of the 
person, resulting in a blending of bodily concerns into the background, freeing the 
mind to pursue the higher goods of wisdom. In the end, instead of a denial of body, it 
can be seen that Socrates considered body as a crucial part of a virtuous life.  
 
In light of his ideas about body, the attitude of Socrates towards death emerges as a 
project that extends to all life itself. One should attempt to live in pursuit of the truths 
of life according to Socrates, not just when he is faced with death, but all the time, 
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even when he thinks he is far from the end, or rather even when this fact remains out 
of his conscious mind, his life should be lived in accordance to his reality. 
 
2.3. On the Relation between Tame Death and Socrates 
 
The last words of Socrates are often invoked in order to illuminate his views on 
death. After drinking the poison and lying down, with his last words Socrates 
entreats an offering to his friend: “Crito, we owe a cock to Asclepius” (Plato, 2005: 
403). Asclepius is the god of medicine and healing.  Why does Socrates, on the brink 
of death, makes an offering to Aesculapius?  
 
As Emily Wilson (2007: 117) notes in her book, there has been a number of 
interpretations of these last words. It is unnecessary to repeat them here but Wilson’s 
interpretation: 
Socrates gives thanks to Asclepius, I would argue, because he has succeeded – 
metaphorically – in giving birth to his own death. Life is not a disease, death is not 
a cure. Rather, dying is like childbirth and death is like being reborn. This reading 
&ts the metaphorical scheme of the dialogue much better than the idea that life is 
like a disease. Socrates has argued that death and life ‘are born’ from one another: 
the whole argument for immortality from opposites is framed in the language of 
birth and generation. 
 
This reading has the advantage of tying back the death of Socrates to the ancient 
ways of dying that Ariès proposes to have preceded all perspectives on death. There 
is a continuum between life and death as in between life and being asleep. Socrates 
does not include darkness or nothingness to describe death. He either considers it as 
sleep or an afterlife, both belonging to the tradition of tame death. Surely, both these 
perspectives still exist today. Yet their effectiveness is in question.  
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Death of Socrates thus becomes an example of tame death in two points that have 
been mentioned previously. It is a communal death in which a group of friends 
surround the dying man, conversing on the issues of a philosophy and it is the death 
of a man who considers life and death in a continuum and simply resigns to the 
reality of his existence. 
 
2.4. The Invisible Death 
 
Both attitudes, belonging to tame death, are disappearing. Dying now belongs to 
hospital rooms and medical professionals rather than a community and death is a 
radical break, rather than a state of sleep or an afterlife that preserves some aspects of 
life. 
It has by now been so obliterated from our culture that it is hard for us to imagine 
or understand it. The ancient attitude in which death is close and familiar yet 
diminished and desensitized is too different from our own view, in which it is so 
terrifying that we no longer dare say its name (Ariès, 2008: 28). 
 
This is of course not a complete obliteration nor is it possible to argue that all people 
resigned to death as calmly as Socrates in the past. Instead this is the emergence of a 
new paradigm of a death, a new death that Ariès calls the invisible death. 
 
Left alone to die in hospitals; bereft of a supernatural world that peopled the afterlife 
and realized it as sleep and in a continuum of life; his God dead and his world 
transformed rapidly, contemporary man, the city dweller, is now faced with a death 
that is terrifying and horrible to face. According to Ariès (2008), this is a break with 
a tradition that has persisted for so long that contemporary attitudes are completely 
new compared to this old tradition. Terror of death is now so unbearable there is an 
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altogether repression of death that is striking in its insistence and pervasiveness. It 
would be anachronistic to argue that death was not repressed in the past. However 
simple and plain the truth of mortality may appear, it is also elusive. As a species that 
have attained consciousness of this reality, humans are equally adept at ignoring it. I 
suspect that this was true in Athens 2400 years ago as it is now and Socrates was 
well aware of it. What changed is that now it is impossible to imagine life and death 
as comparable. That simple perspective in which life and death belongs to a 
continuity is disappearing. Death now appears as a terrifying, alien event that should 
be eliminated completely, an ancient disease that belongs to past. 
 
How was this invisible death born? What was the process that completely reversed 
the ancient attitudes towards death? Could a natural reaction to death have been 
directly related to survival? The death of a member of a hunter group directly 
reduces the chances of survival of the other members of the species. Yet as Ariès 
(2008) notes, the reversal of the attitude of the community demonstrates that such 
reactions are not necessary anymore. There are no such communities today, no 
hunter groups or such close knit relations among a number of people that are related 
to each other based on life and death conditions.2 Because as a species, humans no 
longer feel the need to defend themselves against nature as much as they did in the 
past. 
 
 It would be impossible to write about all the stages of transformation that Ariès 
(2008) explains, yet it must be remembered that the modern model of death that has 
                                                
2 It is telling that these kind of groups frequently crop up in post-apocalyptic narratives such as The 
Walking Dead. Is it a longing or a fragment of memory that is still sensitive to these predicaments?  !"#$%"&%'(")*+,%-&./.-0&.*12".3"43%5"$%'%"03"0"(*'%"6%1%'07"8%'38%-&.9%:"5.3&.1-&"/'*(".&3"43%".1"
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appeared in the twentieth century is completely new and is particular to the 
technologically advanced areas of the Western world.  
 
How the technology has come to be integrated into such an essential part of being, 
that is, death, is first, a question related to technology and second, to being. Such a 
question is possible because of bodies. This point may be better understood when the 
teachings of Socrates are reconsidered. Whatever the case, it is not disputed that 
Socrates discussed the issue of death in his many dialogues with the citizens of 
Athens. Although claiming a kinship of death and philosophy can be refrained from, 
it cannot be denied that contemplation on death is an issue that cannot be articulated 
without the help of that philosophical endeavor to grasp such a subject. It may be that 
such thoughts are essentially philosophical, whatever that entails. Anyway, Socrates 
is a solid evidence for such an argument. It is thus crucial that when Socrates 
contemplates death, he points to a body and a body that is lived. He does not regard 
the question “What will death be like?” to be much of an answerable question. 
Rather he emphasizes that such questioning is itself essential to live a balanced, 
healthy life. Even if there is a separation of soul and body, they are both considered 
to be a part of this reality itself.  
 
This is not a management of eating disorders, a ten point list for healthy living, a role 
model like Dr. Oz. The balance is not within a diet, but between a diet and an active 
participation in philosophical dialogue. Imagine someone sitting in dinner and saying 
something like this: “Let us talk about philosophical issues such as death and not 
what we wear, how much we weigh or what we look like. Let us talk about how we 
live and die.” 
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The reversal of attitudes toward this relation between bodies and death is revealing. 
It is not the goal of Socrates to hold death at bay as long as possible when he 
prescribes a life that turns away (or halfway) from material pursuits. The pleasures 
that one may reach through bodily pleasures or amassing wealth is found unworthy 
for the soul of the philosopher who strives to reach some truth about his reality. This 
is not an evasion of the idea of death nor is it a morbid endeavor that embraces 
nothingness. Rather it is, again for the lack of a better word, a philosophical stance: 
one of reflection, of contemplation. On the other hand, if the attitudes toward bodies 
are technologically mediated, it follows that medicalization may be internalized as a 
way of living. It is not for a balanced life in which the meaning of life and death is 
contemplated that wealth or health is pursued. It is also not because technologies 
transform humans into robots that follow and make use of these technologies, as if 
these technologies are solely responsible for the life of a person. The pursuit of a 
longer life attempts to keep death at bay as long as possible.  
 
Ariès (2008) traces the beginnings of medicalization to Tolstoy’s Three Deaths 
(2008) and The Death of Ivan Ilyich (2008). There are twenty-five years between 
these books and Ariès finds in Three Deaths (Tolstoy, 2008) the beginning of the lie. 
This lie is the lie that tries to hide the truth of death from the loved one and maybe 
even from the self. A rich businessman’s wife is diagnosed with tuberculosis and her 
condition is considered hopeless. But the husband cannot bring himself to tell this to 
her wife. There is a hesitation now that was absent before. Now the idea of death has 
been shrouded in secret. All the people around the dying person now participate in 
this play and death is driven into further secrecy. Only with the help of an older 
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cousin can this reluctance be overcome and “the classic scenario of the good death in 
public” can begin. 
 
On the other hand, Ivan Ilyich is condemned to live this lie to his last days. Before 
his death however, Ilyich becomes obsessed with his diagnosis and the prescriptions 
of the doctor. He reads books, compares similar cases to his own symptoms, and 
consults other doctors but all his knowledge about his illness cannot console him. 
Yet “his state of mind is dependent on two variables: the diagnosis of the illness and 
the effectiveness of the treatment” (Ariès, 2008: 565). His anxiety is alleviated when 
his treatment is effective and he gets anxious when things go wrong. When the 
doctor becomes unsure of the diagnosis, Ivan Ilyich abandons his trust in medical 
science and immediately resorts to religious, magical thinking: he goes to a charlatan 
who “heals with icons”. 
Then begins a long night, in which Ivan Ilyich must endure in silence the pain and 
ugliness of the physical disease, as well as the metaphysical anguish… “The worst 
torment was the lie, this lie that for some reason was accepted by everyone, that he 
was only sick, and not dying, and that if he would only remain calm and take care 
of himself, everything would be fine; whereas he knew very well that no matter 
what was done, the result would only be even worse suffering and death…” (Ariès, 
2008: 567) 
 
As much as the pain of sickness, the lie torments Ivan Ilyich. Because his own death 
first becomes a result of a diagnosis, a phenomenon that occurs between his organs, 
something objective that only medical science has control over and second, even 
when everyone realizes that he is dying, the truth never emerges and thus he cannot 
live his own death. The glaring contradiction of living one’s own death becomes 
something natural when one considers how one dies. 
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Is this not exactly what Socrates warns against, the lies that are uttered just as Ivan 
Ilyich tells himself at his death bed? Is this not the same lie, that if one remains calm 
and take care himself, everything will be fine?  The truth is what is revealed when 
one considers his life and realizes his life as something that is finite. No matter the 
amount of years that are accumulated and added up to the end of a life, the end does 
not change and the outcome is still the same. This does not mean that staying healthy 
or attaining success is worthless and meaningless. What this means is that when they 
are considered and pursued as ends in themselves, the perspective of the basic facts 
of reality is lost, such as mortality. 
 
Thus according to Aries (2008: 595) the most recent model of change begins with 
medicalization and in a more general sense, with the technology behind this:  
People began to believe that there was no limit to the power of technology, either in 
man or in nature. Technology erodes the domain of death until one has the illusion 
that death has been abolished. The area of the invisible death is also the area of the 
greatest belief in the power of technology and its ability to transform man and 
nature. 
 
It is not a coincidence that the lie and the impact of technology both concerns death. 
Technology has become a lasting and pervasive phenomenon for the life of the 
human being. This was not so for Socrates. He did not live in a world that was 
thoroughly transformed by science and technology. Yet his sensitivity for the truth of 
one’s own reality still retains its relevance, which is after all, the beginning of 
science itself. 
 
 
 
  
 
24 
2.5. Conclusion 
 
A brief reconsideration of the advice of Socrates on the issue of indulgence on the 
bodily pursuits is adequate at this juncture. It has been shown that although he may 
first come off as an idealist that completely overlooks the daily experience of living, 
this would be a wrong impression. What Socrates has in mind is a life that balances 
contemplation with the worldly pursuits, both elevated by a conscious, deliberate 
focus on how to live and die.  
 
The idea of a body as the word is generally used is absent here. It is yet to arrive, 
fully fledged, in Cartesian philosophy, which will be discussed in the following 
chapter. For now it is enough to notice that contemplation on death, in itself, as a 
state of being, is not the crucial part of the philosophical contemplation of Socrates 
on the issue of mortality. Rather the question of how to live and face death is much 
more important since the issue of death only arises for the living. 
 
This is not an issue that is particular to Socrates or Ivan Ilyich or you and me. Death 
has been a familiar phenomenon of life since the pre-historical man first come to be 
uniquely conscious of his existence. It was an inevitable fact of life as it is now. 
What changed, and what changed radically is the contemporary ability of the species 
to eradicate pain, make life significantly more secure and in the end, control nature 
and bodies to the extent that the rules that were not even considered as changeable is 
now challenged. Thus what Ariès considers as the ancient, monolithic tradition that 
persisted for thousands of years has been disappearing rapidly in the technologically 
advanced, urban life of Western world since 20th century, replaced by an invisible, 
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terrifying event that escapes the grasp of daily life, vaporizing into the objectifying 
perspective of science and technology thus losing its familiar face to be replaced by 
something new. 
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CHAPTER 3 
 
 
BODY 
 
 
 
In the need to contain the dread of death, lacking the ancient traditions that helped 
one to incorporate it to one’s life relatively easily, new ways are needed to protect 
from the awareness of mortality. Without stable attitudes that are shared across a 
community e.g. the dogmatic symbolism of memento mori, new attitudes that lack 
coherency and resists easy categorization are born. In other words, the attitudes 
toward death reflect in the variety of ways that attempts of escape are made. 
 
It is the body that dies. In the absence of a belief in a soul or an afterlife, this basic 
truth becomes an unbearable, terrible fact. But have these religious beliefs been lost? 
Is it possible to believe in today’s world that belief in a soul or afterlife is a thing of 
the past? No matter the answers, it is reasonable to think that the victory of science in 
the last couple hundred years have been shaping more and more lives. Following 
this, it is not hard to notice the relation between death and technology yet again. The 
simple conclusion that can be drawn is that the attitudes toward death are in constant 
relation with the state of the world, the times are lived in, the knowledge that is 
possessed. So it may be said that even if death is an existential category, something 
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that is personal and related to the individual life of the human beings, it also stands 
outside of the control of the individual and his own attitudes are affected by the 
prevalent attitudes toward it. The change that can be observed in the change from the 
tame death into the untame death of the 20th and 21st century is a symptom of this 
condition. 
 
For all the objective knowledge that the Western society produce, death still evades 
thought easily. It is as if the words themselves are absent, leaving behind extreme 
expressions such as nothingness, darkness, and total unconsciousness. Maybe a 
simple answer should suffice: the separation of the soul from the body. What this 
means is that death is a severing of all that makes an individual, a subject with a 
particular history, a singular identity. Even in this idea, death is a hinge that operates 
between the spheres of this world and an afterlife. The moment that an attempt at 
understanding it is made, there appears something metaphysical that is supposed to 
survive the body. 
 
What about those who do not believe that anything will survive the body? For those 
who believe that life is limited to this world, that there can be no afterlife and that 
nothing will survive the body, it is hard to consider death as a separation or a 
transformation. The finality of death weighs heavy for the modern mind. It is no 
wonder that occupation with bodies is increasing e.g. physical alterations, variety of 
diets, anxiety of body images, not just for living a good life, but arguably, to avoid 
the primacy of body in the composition of reality, and the mortality of it long as 
possible. The approach to how to live a life and face death may have come closer to a 
distorted version of the Socratic approach to death. Where he argued for abstaining 
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from bodily concerns in order to grasp an ideal world and thus consider death as 
nothing to be feared, an overly concerned attitude towards the body can be the sign 
of an attempt to reduce the body into this ideal world, thus attempting to overcome 
its limitations. 
 
The objectification of body, traceable back to the ontological duality of Descartes, 
may be considered as the most significant step towards this shift in attitudes toward 
death.3 Very much influenced by the birth of the modern scientific method and the 
successes that it was responsible for, the foundational system of subjectivity as 
wholly independent from body can be found in the Cartesian philosophy. In such a 
system, the body is reduced to an object.  
 
This is a necessary step within the birth of the scientific, technological outlook of the 
western culture. Body is considered as an object that can be charted medically, 
observed scientifically and understood rationally. With the advance of medical 
technologies, this outlook came to be normalized but even in the 18th century, it can 
be seen that with Descartes the meaning of body starts to change. It begins to lose its 
significance related to evil and this is a very crucial change. But for now it is enough 
to observe that this change is due to the emergence of the modern scientific outlook. 
Surely the reduction of subjectivity into the metaphysical realm of soul by Descartes 
must now seem old fashioned. But the effects of this new understanding of bodies 
are still alive and influential. For instance, mental activities (or what it means to have 
a mind) are explained through chemical reactions or physical explanations. If not as 
machines, some consider human beings as objectively determined by logic, 
                                                !"#$%"&%'(")*+,%-&./.-0&.*12".3"43%5"$%'%"03"0"(*'%"6%1%'07"8%'38%-&.9%:"5.3&.1-&"/'*(".&3"43%".1"83;-$*7*6;";%&"3&.77"*+9.*437;"'%70&%5<"
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evolutionary rules and physical laws. At least, this viewpoint is gaining ground and 
is one of the main components of a technologically mediated perspective. 
 
How to think about death when it can be thought that beyond what can be impartially 
observed awaits a world still unobserved and little less? Too readily death is thought 
as if it is nothingness. But what does it mean when death is said to be nothinges? If it 
the phenomenological argument that consciousness is always consciousness of 
something is accepted, than how to think nothing? Surely, to think about death is 
always to think about something. There is no perspective on death that can escape 
the worldly being of human, his life. Since every approach to it necessitates a living, 
breathing body and a working brain, death is never nothing. It is always the death of 
an organism that evolved a brain capable of contemplating on death and also, to a 
degree, created the very conditions for this contemplation. There is nothing 
metaphysical about death since it is the very essence of nature that death exists. It is 
the necessary condition for life itself. Every thought about death reflects something 
back, captured by words. Yet the scariness of the thought may not have anything to 
do with what it means. Maybe what is dreadful about death is that it does not have 
any meaning in itself. The curse lies in the very language of despair that emerges 
when one thinks about death as his personal annihilation. Having the ability to 
abstract death from life itself, against the completeness of experience and the 
inability to know death in itself, is a kind of curse yet it does not curse life itself. 
When Socrates refrains from asserting any possibility of knowledge of death itself, 
instead offering two very traditional ideas of death and focusing on the very act of 
contemplating death as such, he overcomes the obstacle of wallowing in the desire to 
know the unknowable.  
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In the carcasses of roadside kills, in the passing away of loved ones, in the images of 
violence and in the sickness and pain that it brings, the fact of mortality is reminded. 
No matter how hard this truth is repressed, there is little chance of escaping from 
living it, embodying it. If it is a survival instinct coded into genes or a social 
construct that constantly keeps it in control, not-so-deep-down the reality of death 
makes itself known. The technology which allows the human species to dominate 
nature is for the present incapable of eradicating death. It also cannot offer a 
consoling piece of knowledge about death aside from postponing it. However, that 
deep craving for life itself, which Schopenhauer will call the will-to-live, cannot but 
desire life while at the same time having to carry the burden of knowledge of 
mortality which is, from another perspective, a curse of this flesh, this body. Why 
know this and not know what it is like? It is the missing tooth that constantly calls 
attention to itself. The absence of knowledge of death is unnerving. 
 
The reversal of attitudes toward death finds its parallel in the attitudes toward bodies. 
Modern science and technology persistently alter perspectives of most aspects of 
reality. Consequently, neither death nor bodies are exempt from these shifts in 
perspective. Attitudes toward bodies: anxieties about aging; standards of beauty that 
creates impossible images to compare appearances to; the endless stream of 
information that regulates what, when and how to eat; constant reminders to move, to 
exercise; eating disorders and body anxieties; chemicals of all kinds that are used to 
control every aspect of bodies are all closely related with this radical shift in the 
attitudes that technology plays an important role in shaping. This by no means 
reduces these attitudes to the inner mechanims of certain technologies since these 
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atttitudes must be considered within the existential categories, within the life of the 
individual.  
 
3.1 Schopenhauer and Body 
 
Raj Singh (2007) trails the connection between death and philosophy from Socrates 
to Schopenhauer and Heidegger. His focus is on Schopenhauer and the intimate 
relation of his philosophy to death contemplation and eastern thought. Raj Singh 
points out to Schopenhauer’s essay: “On Death and its Relation to the 
Indestructibility of Our Inner Nature” as a substantial lead for the connection 
between Socrates and Schopenhauer on the issue of death and philosophy. After 
repeating the thoughts of Socrates on how philosophy is a rehearsal of death, 
Schopenhauer (1966: 463) goes on to make a comparison between human beings and 
animals:  
The  animal  lives  without  any  real  knowledge  of  death;  therefore the  
individual  animal immediately  enjoys  the  absolute  imperishableness and 
immortality of the species, since it is  conscious of itself only as  endless.  With 
man the terrifying certainty of death necessarily appeared along with the faculty of 
reason.  But just as  everywhere in nature  a  remedy,  or  at  any  rate  a  
compensation,  is  given  for  every evil,  so  the  same  reflection  that  introduced  
the  knowledge  of  death also  assists  us  in  obtaining  metaphysical  points  of  
view.  Such views console us concerning death, and the animal is neither in need of 
nor capable of them.  All religions  and philosophical systems  are  directed 
principally  to  this  end,  and  are  thus  primarily  the  antidote  to  the certainty  of  
death  which  reflecting  reason  produces  from  its  own resources. 
 
Schopenhauer’s emphasis on the contemplation of death is also a very essential part 
of his whole philosophical system. The subject of body and death is central to 
Schopenhauer’s ideas about the world as Will. The concept of Will, which will later 
be one of the influences of Nietzsche, is according to Schopenhauer reality itself. It is 
a mindless, non-rational force that does not have a goal other than perpetuating itself. 
  
 
32 
The crucial part is that the body is the key to understanding the entirety of being as 
Will. 
 
To the subject of knowing,  who  appears  as  an individual only through his  
identity with  the  body,  this  body  is  given  in  two  entirely different  ways.  It is 
given in intelligent perception as representation, as an object among objects, liable 
to the laws of these objects.  But it is  also  given  in quite a different  way,  namely  
as  what  is  known  immediately  to  everyone,  and  is  denoted  by  the  word  
will.  Every  true act of his will is  also  at once and inevitably  a movement of his  
body; he cannot actually will the act without  at the  same  time  being  aware that it  
appears  as  a  movement  of  the  body.  The  act  of will  and  the action  of  the  
body  are  not  two  different  states  objectively  known, connected by the bond of 
causality; they do  not stand in the  relation of cause and effect,  but are  one  and  
the  same  thing,  though  given  in two entirely different ways, first quite directly, 
and then in perception for  the understanding (Schopenhauer, 1966: 100). 
 
In other words, a human body cannot merely be an object among other objects. It 
surely is an object just like any other object. But a human being also inhabits his 
body. Schopenhauer challenges the relation of body and subjectivity that was up to 
him considered within the Cartesian framework. Schopenhauer rejects the mind-body 
dualism by focusing on the lived experience of the body which does not feel as if it is 
merely an object that stands out there, observable through cause and effect relations. 
Instead body is given in two ways, as representation and as Will.  
 
How to think about Schopenhauer’s Will? It is at first instance very familiar. Before 
even considering death, will is the hunger and its satisfaction, desire and its 
frustration. The Will is that endless pursuit of happiness, of possessing an object, the 
abject fear that the exposure to flesh and its monstrosities provokes. It is the 
pendulum that goes between boredom and satisfaction, creating the illusion of a very 
near future where the tide of reality falls; where actually human beings are 
surrounded by nothing in a perpetual present: the nothingness of a past that is 
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destroyed and a future that is yet to arrive. The tragedy of existence, death having the 
lead part, is the tragedy of a body that is unable to control the Will acting out on its 
own, manifesting itself in the pursuit of the world itself, where a tidal wave of 
hunger, desire, need and pain is penetrated by momentary relapses of pleasure. The 
pessimism here is disturbing and uncomfortable for the positivist. As such, 
Schopenhauer is the lone figure in post-Kantian German Idealism that culminates in 
the philosophy of Hegel.4 
 
Just like Socrates, Schopenhauer argues for a philosophical system that embraces the 
certainty of death and makes it an integral part of its perspective. Similarly, he argues 
for a rejection of this Will which he considers the bodily pursuits to be the primary 
appearance of. Where Socrates focused on a death that meant a refrain from bodily 
pursuits in favor of philosophical contemplation of death, the rejection of will by 
Schopenhauer begins with a realization of the Will as the root evil of existence:  
This denial of the will-to-live seems to be essentially the same as what we have 
called “death-contemplation,” or the practice of doing without what is commonly 
called “the good life.” According to Schopenhauer, there are two mutually 
connected insights that lead a thoughtful person to choose the path of willlessness. 
The knowledge of boundless suffering of the human and animal world combined 
with its transitoriness, that is, a compassionate acknowledgement and a conscious 
identi&cation with the sufferings of others could inspire one to renounce the matter-
of-course life of the will. At the same time, the knowledge of “the inner nature of 
the thing-in-itself,” or the rare possibility of the otherwise blind will-to-live 
becoming self-aware, also drives one toward a voluntary willlessness. Only in the 
human entity, the will has a possibility to take a pause, become aware of its own 
machinations and to deny itself (Raj Singh, 2007: 44). 
 
When one realizes the immense suffering that lies at the heart of nature at any time 
and the pointlessness of all the bodily pleasures in the face of this suffering; and 
when one grasps that all worldly pursuits amount to nothing in the face of death, he 
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arrives at the philosophical frame of mind which renounces the Will and all its 
representations. 
 
Schopenhauer (1966: 311) makes use of a symbol of the vanitas tradition, the soap-
bubble, reminding us that all is in vain: 
Every breath we draw wards off the death that constantly impinges on us. In this 
way, we struggle with it every second, and again at longer intervals through every 
meal we eat, every sleep we take, every time we warm ourselves, and so on. 
Ultimately death must triumph, for by birth it has already become our lot, and it 
plays with its prey only for a while before swallowing it up. However, we continue 
our life with great interest and much solicitude as long as possible, just as we blow 
out a soap-bubble as long and as large as possible, although with the perfect 
certainty that it will burst. 
 
While the contrast with the positivism of German idealism is apparent, the 
pessimistic argument here stands at the other edge, failing to recognize experience in 
its entirety. It may also be easily argued that existence is neither a system that would 
arrive at a positive age of enlightenment that would eradicate all ignorance and pain, 
nor is it a principally evil phenomenon that is filled with pain and suffering. It may 
be said that existence is contradictory in that it is filled with joy and suffering, 
ignorance and objective knowledge, certainty and ambiguity all at the same time. It 
is confound; and it is irreducible to one aspect of existence or one outcome out of all 
the unimaginable paths of future.  
 
Leaving aside the pessimistic arguments, the important part here is the central role of 
body in the philosophy of Schopenhauer. By considering the Will and the body as 
two aspects of the same thing, Schopenhauer challenges the Cartesian understanding 
of a mind, influencing body through a cause-effect relation. There is no soul in 
Schopenhauer’s philosophy but a blind, terrible principle that takes form as the body 
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of a human being, among other things. The uniqueness of the human being is its 
ability to comprehend death in all its certainty. But he also has the ability to remedy 
this certainty by metaphysical thoughts. One example is the mind – body duality that 
is at the foundation of Cartesian philosophy. Here the body is a vestige that is shed 
on the instance of death which amounts to a rejection of both the bodily, fleshy 
aspect of experience and the inevitability of death. Schopenhauer realizes that both 
are part and parcel of day to day life but also takes the argument further and 
generalizes pain and death as the essential principle of all existence. Following this, 
the only respite from the evil of existence is reflection on the inevitability of death 
and suffering; and the recognition of these in the others and hence a renunciation of 
all bodily aspects of being. 
 
Why body is thus rejected? Nietzsche (2005: 202) has these to say about 
Schopenhauer: 
Specifically, he is a viciously ingenious attempt to use the great self-affirmation of 
the 'will to live', the exuberant forms of life, in the service of their opposite, a 
nihilistic, total depreciation of the value of life. He interpreted art, heroism, genius, 
beauty, great sympathy, knowledge, the  will  to truth,  and  tragedy one  after the  
other  as consequences of 'negation' or some need to negate on the part of the  'will' 
-the  greatest psychological counterfeit in history,  Christianity excluded. 
 
 
Schopenhauer fails to affirm the will to live. Rather he negates it by considering art 
as a need on the part of will to negate itself, perpetuating the morality of Christianity. 
This may also be said about Schopenhauer on the issue of body. When  the existence 
of the human being in this world is considered, it is true that there is nothing ideal 
about it. He gets sick, suffers and dies. Yet there is also joy in life. And not just mere 
satisfaction, there is pleasure and happiness in the very matter of existing as a body, 
of having emotions, loving and hating. However finite it is, the fact of mortality does 
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not imply that the will to live should be negated in spite of living. Otherwise it would 
mean a kind of surrender to death. 
 
While Schopenhauer recognizes that existence is grounded in this world, in the flesh 
and bone of bodies, he does not delve into all its implications. His pessimism and 
failure to negate death implies that his ideas about body were just the first instance 
that would later be further elaborated by later philosophers. 
 
3.2 Lived Body 
 
What is meant when it is said that it is the body that dies? It seems like the religious 
idea of life as expressing the duality of experience as life and something else than 
life, which is more often death. In the religious perspective, death is kept at bay since 
there is no actual death. There is something imperishable, pure and ideal that must 
resist the earthly pull of desire and suffering. Even the fate of this body is irrelevant 
when considered against the immortality of soul.  Faith thus acts as salvation from 
death but also death itself is salvation from pain, doubt and anxiety. This  is of course 
again only available to those who manage to restrain their bodily impulses, belong to 
a community that shares the same religious reactions and rituals and is able to face 
death as a community, and live according to a set of rules that are all in all, dogmatic. 
In other words, they must learn to die in life in order to face death without fear. 
 
Putting aside the religious interpretation of the question, can a scientific perspective 
be assumed? Assuming an objective perspective to bodies, it may be concluded that 
human beings are nothing more than bodies and that death is a natural phenomenon 
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that must be faced rationally. Yet this view seems to constrain thought to a purely 
objective reality that often fails to capture the irrational, ambiguous and 
contradictory nature of Being. For instance the symbolic language of memento mori 
attempts to give expression to this reality, occupying a considerable place in the 
inner life of pre-industrial, pre-medicalization human being. Science replaces this 
view with an entirely different outlook that lacks such morality but inevitably has 
ethical consequences. Overlooking the ethical questions, it may at least be aruged 
that scientific viewpoint cannot exhaust all the possibilities of expression that 
attempts to capture in words the entirety of the world as it is experienced by human 
beings.  
 
What is necessary in order to understand this body that dies is an account of what it 
means to live a body and Merleau-Ponty’s philosophy is able to achieve this. In order 
to understand what he has to say about bodies, a closer look at the historical context 
of his philosophy is necessary. 
 
Hass (2008) argues that one of Merleau-Ponty’s greatest achievements is his 
overcoming of the representational theory of perception. Descartes considers body 
and soul as ontologically distinct substances that somehow interact with each other. 
The subject – object dichotomy that lies at the foundation of modern philosophy is 
thus born and body is immediately cast outside the scope of experience, relegated to 
a machine with observable parts, operating within a strict cause – effect relationship. 
However Descartes does not arrive here out of the blue. In his search for certainty in 
knowledge, his famous method of doubt eliminates the information that one gets 
through senses, finding perception easily deceived. For if it is often impossible to tell 
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if it is a dream or not while dreaming, might one not be dreaming still even when one 
supposed to beawake? In the end, only this “I” remains in the face of the method of 
doubt, the metaphysical subject that is more or less devoid of flesh and bone and 
desire. 
 
In the Cartesian framework, thus the world of senses, what is perceived through eyes 
and ears and all the other organs are just representations of another substance that 
causes these representations through the senses. This mind should not be understood 
in today’s cognitive sense since it is metaphysical and belongs to another, ideal 
world. The distrust of senses is nothing new but the resulting mechanistic ideas about 
the nature of senses is the opposite of the long-standing tradition of organic nature of 
the world as can be found in Aristotle.  The Cartesian Theatre is thus born out of a 
dualistic nature: on the one hand, the pure immortal soul that experiences the world 
and on the other, the world that operates according to Newtonian physics rather than 
Aristotelian. The mind-body dualism that this idea results in has been one of the 
primary problems of Western modern philosophy. 
 
Hass (2008) considers Merleau-Ponty’s philosophy as the overcoming of two 
traditional theories of perception. One is the representational theory of perception as 
can be found in its classical form in Cartesian philosophy. This is an empirical 
tradition which considers sensation as consisting of atomic parts. These sense-qualia 
end in perception as an “internal veil of ideas” which can only exist in a dualistic and 
theological framework. This religious and dualistic perspective conceals the deeper 
fact of perception that is lived. In other words, the daily experience of the world does 
not reveal such a distinct duality. The screen that I am perceiving as I write these 
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words appear to me as here and not as a reflection on a screen that is supposed to be 
in my mind. Even body itself becomes a representation as it comes to be understood 
through the metaphors of technology and science. As a consequence, body becomes 
a machine and experience becomes the experience of a soul that occupies the body as 
a ghost. The other tradition is contemporary physicalism. This tradition has the merit 
of not being dualistic but it is reductionist. It reduces perception into 
neurophysiological processes. While these are surely essential parts of experience, 
they can in no way exhaust the reality of phenomenal world.  
 
This is not the place to examine these traditions in detail. It is enough to say that 
Cartesian understanding of perception distorts the lived experience and replaces it 
with a fantastical contraption of a machine-body that houses a soul. This perspective 
fails in so many ways. One is its inability to give a proper account for the interaction 
between these two distinct substances and another is its representational theory about 
perception which betrays several essential characteristics about lived experience. On 
the other hand, physicalism surely explains an aspect of the reality of perception but 
it often overreaches and claims that there is no more to perception than physical 
interactions between the material world out there and minds. The failure of 
physicalism is less obvious since it is ridiculous to argue that theories of cognitive 
science or neurobiology fail to explain the reality of perception. As Hass (2008) 
argues, this is not the case. Scientific explanation about perception is absolutely 
necessary and essential to understanding. The argument here is that the success of 
scientific explanation should not be mistaken for the whole story. The phenomenal 
world that emerges for the human being is always more than a discourse or a text. 
There is always something left behind, something that cannot be said by a single 
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discourse. Failure to acknowledge the inexhaustible nature of reality constraints the 
understanding of the world into a single perspective. 
 
Than what is phenomenology? What kind of a perspective it is? What does Merleau-
Ponty offer us to enrich the understanding of perception and bodily being?  
Probably  the  chief  gain  from  phenomenology  is  to  have  united extreme  
subjectivism  and  extreme  objectivism  in  its  notion  of  the world  or  of  
rationality.  Rationality is precisely proportioned to the experiences in which it is 
disclosed. To say that there exists rationality is to say that perspectives blend, 
perceptions con&rm each other, a meaning emerges. But it should not be set in a 
realm apart, transposed into absolute Spirit, or into a world in the realist sense. The 
phenomenological world is not pure being, but the sense which is revealed where 
the paths of my various experiences intersect, and also where my own and other 
people’s intersect and engage each other like gears. It is thus inseparable  from  
subjectivity  and  intersubjectivity,  which  &nd  their unity when I either take up 
my past experiences in those of the present, or other people’s in my own. For the 
&rst time the philosopher’s thinking is sufficiently conscious not to anticipate itself 
and endow its own results with rei&ed form in the world (Merleau-Ponty, 2005: 
XXII) 
 
The extreme subjectivism and the extreme objectivism that plague both Cartesian 
philosophy and contemporary physicalism are united in phenomenology. Yet even 
phenomenology cannot fully exhaust the multiplicity of possible perspectives that are 
born out of the intersection of personal experience, subjectivity and intersubjectivity. 
Even “the phenomenological world is not pure being”. 
The  &rst philosophical act would appear to be to return to the world of actual 
experience which is prior to the objective  world,  since  it  is  in  it  that  we  shall  
be  able  to  grasp  the theoretical basis no less than the limits of that objective 
world, restore to things their concrete physiognomy, to organisms their individual 
ways of dealing with the world, and to subjectivity its inherence in history. Our 
task will be, moreover, to rediscover phenomena, the layer of living experience 
through which other people and things are &rst given to us, the system ‘Self-others-
things’ as it comes into being; to reawaken perception and foil its trick of allowing 
us to forget it as a fact and as perception in the interest of the object which it 
presents to us and of the rational tradition to which it gives rise (Merleau-Ponty, 
2005: 66). 
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Simply put, against the two traditions of representation which is always related to 
how these traditions consider body, phenomenology is a return to experience as it is 
lived. It is no wonder that one’s body is crucial in Merleau-Ponty’s philosophy. In 
the system of self-others-things, in other words in the field of phenomena, body 
occupies the singular position as the opening of being into this field.  
The body is the vehicle of being in the world, and having a body is, for a living 
creature, to be intervolved in a de&nite environment, to identify oneself with certain 
projects and be continually committed to them. In the self-evidence of this 
complete world in which manipulatable objects still  &gure, in the force of their 
movement which still  'ows towards him, and in which is still present the project 
of writing or playing the piano, the cripple still &nds the guarantee of his 
wholeness. But in concealing his de&ciency from him, the world cannot fail 
simultaneously to reveal it to him: for if it is true that I am conscious of my body 
via the world, that it is the unperceived term in the centre of the world towards 
which all objects turn their face, it is true for the same reason that my body is the 
pivot of the world: I know that objects have several facets because I could make a 
tour of inspection of them, and in that sense I am conscious of the world through 
the medium of my body (Merleau-Ponty, 2005: 94). 
 
Similar to the realization of Schopenhauer, Merleau-Ponty argues that one’s body is 
not simply an object among other objects. In fact it is impossible to consider one’s 
body as one considers other objects of the world since body itself is the very 
permanent perspective through which one perceives the objects. It is impossible to 
perceive bodies as if they are simply objects such as a chair. To perceive a chair is to 
perceive it from a distinct perspective which one is already aware is not restricted to 
that one side of the chair. My body can move around the chair and take positions in 
relation to it. On the other hand, one cannot move around one’s body. There is but 
one single perspective of it which is permanent. In fact, Merleau-Ponty (2005) argues 
that the permanency of body is of a different kind from the permanency of objects 
and also the permanency and absence of objects can only be understood in relation to 
the permanency of body. 
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This should not be understood as a simple duality between a permanent body and a 
world of objects. On the contrary, the body and the world, even if they may seem to 
be separate from each other, are in a continuous reciprocal relation with each other. 
This reciprocity holds an important place in Phenomenology of Perception and is 
later taken up again by Merleau-Ponty and given new expression as reversibility and 
flesh. Even more than reciprocity or simple exchange between the body and the 
world, there is a difference that overlaps and intertwines the body and the world that 
it meets: “…between my body looked at and my body looking, my body touched and 
my body touching, there is overlapping or encroachment, so that we must say that the 
things pass into us as well as we into the things (Merleau-Ponty, 1968: 123).” 
 
The gap between my body looked at and my body looking is the very space of 
openness that allows one to sense the world around him. Through this difference 
between my body seen and my body seeing emerges the world as it is perceived. It is 
true that the objects that I perceive are different, other than me. Yet they open up 
themselves to senses. In other words, the openness that Merleau-Ponty ascribes to the 
body is not a gap that leaves the world of objects on one side and a pure subject on 
the other. There is not opposition but an “overlapping difference” which perfectly 
captures Merleau-Ponty’s conception of living perception (Hass, 2008).  
 
The most important expression in Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenology may be the flesh. 
According to Hass (2008: 138), there are three different ways that Merleau-Ponty 
employs this concept. One is the carnal nature of Being: 
This carnal ensemble of myself, other creatures, and sensible things is part of what 
Merleau-Ponty means when he speaks of “the flesh of the world”: not the absurdity 
that everything is literally flesh and blood, but that despite all the irreducible 
differences, we all share kinds of corporeality. In this first sense of flesh as 
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carnality,  Merleau-Ponty uses the term as an intentional, strategic alternative to the  
age- old notion of “matter”—a notion that homogenizes everything it touches and 
eliminates every ounce of sensual contact. No doubt: “flesh” is sometimes used by 
Merleau-Ponty for its power to evoke the sensual carnality of living experience. 
 
In other places, Merleau-Ponty uses flesh as designating reversibility. The paradox of 
the objects is an appropriate example for this second sense of flesh. Even though the 
objects are different than us, they are not the opposite. There is a latent reversibility 
and an intertwining between the world and me. 
 
The third use of flesh may be said to follow from other uses. What Merleau-Ponty 
expresses is a field of Visibility that one arrives at when he considers perception. 
What is called the seer and the visible world is caught up in the same fabric of flesh. 
What Merleau-Ponty calls the “fundamental narcissism of all vision” has two senses. 
First is the reversibility of seeing where one’s body is the opening to a world that 
both transcends itself but also is itself a part of. Merleau-Ponty describes this as if the 
world and the body are two mirrors facing one another, neither one of them carrying 
a more real image than the other, reflecting each other as a couple and thus are more 
real together than either of them alone. The image that is born out of this reversible 
relation is one sense of the narcissism of vision since it is nothing more than himself 
that the seer perceives: he is captured in this Visibility where it is not possible to 
strictly point out where he ends and the world begins. Here the second sense of the 
narcissism of vision is arrived at, through which the third sense of the flesh can be 
understood.  
And thus, for the same reason, the vision he exercises, he also undergoes from the 
things, such that, as many painters have said, I feel myself looked at by the things, 
my activity is equally passivity—which is the second and more profound sense of 
the narcissism: not to see in the outside, as the others see it, the contour of a body 
one inhabits, but especially to be seen by the outside, to exist within it, to emigrate 
into it, to be seduced, captivated, alienated by the phantom, so that the seer and the 
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visible reciprocate one another and we no longer know which sees and which is 
seen. It is this Visibility, this generality of the Sensible in itself, this anonymity 
innate to Myself that we have previously called flesh, and one knows there is no 
name in traditional philosophy to designate it. The flesh is not matter, in the sense 
of corpuscles of being which would add up or continue on one another to form 
beings. Nor is the visible (the things as well as my own body) some "psychic" 
material that would be—God knows how—brought into being by the things 
factually existing and acting on my factual body. In general, it is not a fact or a sum 
of facts "material" or "spiritual." Nor is it a representation for a mind: a mind could 
not be captured by its own representations; it would rebel against this insertion into 
the visible which is essential to the seer. The flesh is not matter, is not mind, is not 
substance. To designate it, we should need the old term "element," in the sense it 
was used to speak of water, air, earth, and fire, that is, in the sense of a  general 
thing, midway between the spatio-temporal individual and the idea, a sort of 
incarnate principle that brings a style of being wherever there is a fragment of 
being. The flesh is in this sense an "element" of Being (Merleau-Ponty, 1968: 139). 
 
In this elementary sense, flesh is a general Visibility that every perceiving thing is a 
part of. This flesh is not a substance and it is also not a mind. As such, the other 
individuals, the sky above and my own body are all flesh insofar they are Visible. 
There is no objective reality that stands outside the subject as if the seer perceives the 
world from another dimension, another substance that touches without touching, sees 
without seeing. Merleau-Ponty argues simply that seeing is being seen and being 
seen is being intertwined in the reversible folds of the flesh. This is not just being 
looked at by another person. It is the overlooked, silent perception of the world 
which in the normal course of things resists awareness. Yet it is also very familiar. 
When writing on a keyboard, the awareness of the positioning of fingers as they find 
the letters that make up the words that are intended to be written down or the plastic 
of the buttons that give tactile feedback to  fingertips remain silent.It is this silent but 
fundamental bodily being that Merleau-Ponty expresses in his concept of flesh. 
 
The flesh of the world is not the body in itself. It is neither subjective nor objective 
but the landscape for all such perspectives. My body is my opening into the flesh but 
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this opening is not in opposition to the flesh. In fac the body, by respect of it being 
seen, is itself flesh. This should not be understood as a homogenous experience of 
the world, a reduction of Being into a central concept that attempts to exhaust all 
perspectives. On the contrary, as a folding over of all seers to the same fabric of 
Being, flesh is thoroughly heterogeneous and is a field that multiplicity of 
perspectives, that of mine and the other, emerges. 
If we can show that the flesh is an ultimate notion, that it is not the union or 
compound of two substances, but thinkable by itself, if there is a relation of the 
visible with itself that traverses me and constitutes me as a seer, this circle which I 
do not form, which forms me, this coiling over of the visible upon the visible, can 
traverse, animate other bodies as well as my own. And if I was able to understand 
how this wave arises within me, how the visible which is yonder is simultaneously 
my landscape, I can understand a fortiori that elsewhere it also closes over upon 
itself and that there are other landscapes besides my own. If it lets itself be 
captivated by one of its fragments, the principle of captation is established, the field 
open for other Narcissus, for an "intercorporeity” (Merleau-Ponty, 1968: 140). 
 
With his notion of flesh and intercorporeity, Merleau-Ponty points us to the notion of 
living perception, a lived body. Experience of the world is not a representation of a 
reality that can only be grasped through rationality. On the contrary, experience is 
the direct presentation of the world. However, reality is not passively received. The 
world emerges as a field of perception born out of the interaction between the body, 
the objects and other people.  
 
3.3 The Body Is Not a Machine 
 
Embedded in the folds of flesh, the lived-body cannot be circumscribed by a single 
perspective. The complexity of the permanence of body and its fundamental relation 
to perception as an organic being that exists surrounded by what Merleau-Ponty calls 
the Invisible, which is the domain of language, culture, social structures and art is too 
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much for a single discourse to explain away. While both The Visible and The 
Invisible are aspects of flesh, the domain of The Invisible is harder to express in a 
phenomenological framework. But it can be seen in the ways that attitudes have a 
way of informing perception. The case in point is the mechanistic perspective of 
body that plagues Cartesian philosophy.  
 
The philosophy of Descartes distorts the reality of being body by constricting life 
into the narrow framework of cause and effect, effectively rendering body no more 
than a machine. This understanding of the body flies in the face of lived experience, 
failing to account for the deeper recesses of our fundamental being in the world. This 
is essential to the human being, his body and his being caught in an intersecting web 
of perspectives, of other bodies, of aspects of his bodily being, his gender, his race, 
his mortality. Failure to incorporate such fundamental elements of experience in turn 
results in reductive attitudes toward the inexhaustibly rich and deep fabric of reality.  
In my being I cannot discern myself as a ghost or a mind in a machine or an 
objectively circumscribed organism. I inhabit a succession of perspectives, a variety 
of experiences that invariably involve the body as their nexus. However, the 
fundamentality of bodily being cannot prevent the obstruction of elementary 
“belongingness” to the same world: the primal existence that is forever intertwined 
within the folds of flesh.  
 
Cartesian philosophy is indebted to the birth of modern scientific model that purports 
to capture perception, yet by dint of its capture, is itself captured by its own mode of 
looking. What Foucault (Foucault, 1995) calls the age of “Man-the-Machine” is in 
part a history of Cartesian philosophy and its representational theory of perception 
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and its consideration of body in mechanistic terms. The representational 
understanding of perception still informs language, the ways of thinking about 
seeing. And while the body is not considered as a machine nowadays, is it not 
sometimes thought that mind is a kind of computer?5 
 
Can these discourses, these models of body that fail to realize the lived experience in 
turn affect the perception of the world? The answer is yes and no. Yes they can and 
they do inform the way the world is perceived. 
It was postulated that our experience, already besieged by physics and biology, was 
destined to be completely absorbed  into  objective  knowledge,  with  the  
consummation  of  the system  of  the  sciences.  Thenceforth the experience of the 
body degenerated into a ‘representation’ of the body; it was not a phenomenon but 
a fact of the psyche. In the matter of living appearance, my visual body includes a 
large gap at the level of the head, but biology was there ready to &ll that gap… 
Now the psychologist could imitate the scientist and, for a moment at least, see his 
body as others saw it, and conversely see the bodies of others as mechanical things 
with no inner life. The contribution made from the experiences of others had the 
effect of dimming the structure of his own, and conversely, having lost contact 
with himself he became blind to the behaviour of others. He thus saw everything 
from the point of view of universal thought which abolished equally his experience 
of others and his experience of himself (Merleau-Ponty, 2005: 108). 
 
It is obvious that these perspectives of bodies, the ways the world is perceived 
themselves can have a blinding effect to the lived experience of the world. Certain 
ways of looking, such as the objective perspective of science, can obscure certain 
aspects of reality. But this does not preclude the phenomenological expression. As 
such, Merleau-Ponty’s philosophy can be considered as a counter-transformative 
expression that attempts to alleviate the distortive effects of extreme objectivism and 
extreme subjectivism. 
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3.4 Death Within The Flesh 
 
In The Seventh Seal (Bergman, 1957), a film that is filled with medieval images of 
memento mori, Death comes to the Crusader and after declaring that he has been 
with him for all his life, asks the knight if he is afraid. The Crusader answers, “My 
flesh is afraid, but I am not”. When the Crusader utters the word flesh, he is using it 
in the traditional medieval sense. The flesh that sins, that is weak and that cannot 
escape death. This flesh is in contrast with the religious aspects of the soul, its purity 
and its ability to attain immortality. It is this flesh that is afraid of death but 
somehow, somewhere inside, the Crusader is not afraid. 
 
Merleau-Ponty’s notion of flesh is quite distinct from this traditional notion. It may 
however be argued that in choosing the word flesh and emphasizing the reversibility 
of one’s body with the world itself, Merleau-Ponty brings forth the perishable nature 
of bodies. As all living things die, so do we.  
 
So it is this body that dies: the body that is caught up in the flesh, reversible between 
the world and itself. How to think about the death of such a body? The Crusader’s 
belief in the immortal soul can be hard to assume. In that religious tradition, the flesh 
is not the flesh on the bones, as if it is a vessel for the soul. With Merleau-Ponty’s 
philosophy, the body and soul is expressed in a single utterance. At the core of 
Being, at the expression of lived experience, the enfolding of the world over itself 
can be glimpsed. In body’s belongingness to the world, there is something that resists 
the objectifying gaze but can only be fully expressed and not explained. Or rather, 
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this something is only distorted when it is subjected to materialist or physicalist 
accounts; or even to the narrow perspective of a single discourse.  
 
How to understand death without recourse to a metaphysical realm or without 
objectifying it? In other words, can phenomenology help us face death, that most 
elusive and dark notion? The attempt seems absurd at first look. Since death is never 
experienced, it is impossible to talk about it in terms of lived experience. Yet even if 
there can be no talk of death as there can be talk about the tree that is seen from the 
window, there is no denying death, not more than the tree can be denied. How is it 
that such nothingness, such a state of non-being - for death seems as if it is 
nothingness - can be a part of Being? Because if death is taken to be merely the 
obliteration of oneself, an event horizon that is the very antithesis of life, similar to 
how the experience of bodies is distorted, there is a distortion of death and 
sometimes a surrendering. There is surrendering because death is already hidden out 
of view, out of life. Death becomes transcendent, something that defies 
understanding. For nothingness is simply too alien to experience and language fails 
to capture it. This failure to capture it in discourse, to delineate death in precise 
terms, gives birth to more despair.  The consequent logic is simple: if death would 
become such an objective event, than it may be dominated. If it were to emerge as an 
observable event with definite contours, it may be prevented. Yet the dreadful 
attempt of realizing death in the background of its nothingness is a new phenomenon. 
It is the new death of 20th and 21st century, pushed out of the house, the city and the 
life of the community; it could never be pushed out of the deeper core of the 
individual. Its certainty and its connection to one’s own life are simply too essential 
to be completely hidden from view. However, as death becomes taboo and all the 
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traditional ways of facing it disappears from social life; as religious faith is 
threatened and cast into doubt, there are few ways for the modern human being to 
deal with this core issue. Considering death from such an individual perspective, in 
the expense of other perspectives, such as the traditional attitude towards death, is a 
direct consequence of a general attitude toward life itself. The eternal nothingness of 
death and the pervasive fundamentality of this idea is a result of these shifts in 
attitudes, precipitated by medicalization, by industrialization and by the normalized 
attitudes that belong to scientific advances dating back to 17th century e.g. the 
representational theory of perception. Technology and science threatens to obviate 
other perspectives, casting the religious attitude as simply too metaphysical for the 
modern human being. But it too fails to comprehend life and death as it is lived.  
 
Yet death resists. It resists being dominated. This resistance, in the face of all the 
enhancements of daily life with technology and science, begins to stand out more and 
more. The pain is eliminated but death remains unconquerable. Against this 
resistance against objectifying, of precise articulation, more often than not there can 
be surrendering.  
 
This surrender is troubling; it even affects those who face up to death with all 
courage. When it is argued that death anxiety is the fundamental anxiety and the 
source of all creativity, already the experience of the world is surrendered to an 
original contradiction that simply cannot be understood without a primal 
belongingness to life. Reducing all cultural activities of the human being as a 
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reaction to death is a turning away from the completeness of Being6. Consider a 
simple meeting with death. Consider coming upon the carcass of an animal in the 
woods, in a state of decomposition. A fox stands outside even when it is alive, with 
its hurried activity and his avoidance of danger, but if it is a dead fox, something else 
stands out: its inactivity. It is not simply an immaterial thing as if it is a rock but it is 
an empty husk. It seems unnecessary even an anomaly in itself. Yet consider the life 
that is teeming in its belly even if it is a disgusting image. What is that disgust but 
the very interweaving of life and death, too apparent, too fleshy for comprehension? 
It lacks the animating something, it does not react to the predator’s perception of it, it 
does not run away with adrenaline coursing in its veins, it does not have a life that 
may be imagined when it disappears behind the bushes. An emotion of pity can be 
felt, but deep there is also an awareness of the inevitabilitry of it, of the 
inconsequentiality of emotions such as pity or disgust. In the end, the encounter with 
the dead body of the fox is not simply an encounter with death, but with life in all its 
ambiguity. That is the flesh of Merleau-Ponty: the very overlapping of life and death 
that cannot be constrained by the objectifying look of science or the duality of 
religion. In the meeting of a dead body, in the absence of a loved one, in the great 
catastrophes that tear down the normalcy of experience, there is too much awareness 
of the belongingness to life which is the very field for the emergence of the idea of 
death. And in this awareness of reversibility, the instant that the flesh becomes 
visible in its anonymity, death itself becomes an aspect of this Visibility.  
Neither  my  birth  nor  my  death  can  appear  to  me  as experiences of my own, 
since, if I thought of them thus, I should be assuming myself to be pre-existent to, 
or outliving, myself, in order to be able to experience them, and I should therefore 
not be genuinely thinking of my birth or my death. I can, then, apprehend myself 
only as ‘already born’ and ‘still alive’—I can apprehend my birth and my death 
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only as prepersonal horizons: I know that people are born and die, but I cannot 
know my own birth and death. Each sensation, being strictly speaking, the &rst, last 
and only one of its kind, is a birth and a death. The subject who experiences it 
begins and ends with it, and as he can neither precede nor survive himself, 
sensation necessarily appears to itself in a setting of generality, its origin is anterior 
to myself, it arises from sensibility which has preceded it and which will outlive it, 
just as my  birth  and  death  belong  to  a  natality  and  a  mortality  which  are 
anonymous. By means of sensation I am able to grasp, on the fringe of my  own  
personal  life  and  acts,  a  life  of  given  consciousness  from which these latter 
emerge, the life of my eyes, hands and ears, which are so many natural selves. Each 
time I experience a sensation, I feel that it concerns not my own being, the one for 
which I am responsible and for which I make decisions, but another self which has 
already sided with  the  world,  which  is  already  open  to  certain  of  its  aspects  
and synchronized  with  them.  Between  my  sensation  and  myself  there stands 
always the thickness of some primal acquisition which prevents my experience 
from being clear of itself. I experience the sensation as a modality of a general 
existence, one already destined for a physical world and which runs through me 
without my being the cause of it (Merleau-Ponty, 2005: 250). 
 
The anonymity of death is the anonymity of the skeleton in memento mori and also 
the anonymity of the Will of Schopenhauer. Merleau-Ponty saves this anonymity 
from its rational and religious foundations and situates it at the heart of nature, the 
body. This body and its primal Being can neither be the place of a fundamental death 
anxiety that structures all human activity and penetrate all Being, nor is it free from 
death anxiety since it is here in this primal sense that the awareness of death resides 
in, but never in isolation. Death is simply too intertwined with life for it to be 
realized in itself and any attempt to do so is a relatively new and a definitely failing 
enterprise. 
 
 Aside from this first meeting with death, there is also another sense that death makes 
itself known which is its certainty and the knowledge of this certainty that human 
beings possess but also is possessed by it. 
…my birth and death cannot be objects of thought for me.  Being  established  in  
my  life,  buttressed  by  my thinking nature, fastened down in this transcendental  
&eld which was opened  for  me  by  my  &rst  perception,  and  in  which  all  
absence  is merely the obverse of a presence, all silence a modality of the being of 
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sound, I enjoy a sort of ubiquity and theoretical eternity, I feel destined to move in 
a  'ow of endless life, neither the beginning nor the end of which I can experience 
in thought, since it is my living self who think of them, and since thus my life 
always precedes and survives  itself.  Yet this same thinking nature which produces 
in me a superabundance of being opens the world to me through a perspective, 
along with which there comes to me the feeling of my contingency,  the  dread  of  
being  outstripped,  so  that,  although  I  do  not manage to encompass my death in 
thought, I nevertheless live in an atmosphere of death in general, and there is a kind 
of essence of death always on the horizon of my thinking. In short, just as the 
instant of my death is a future to which I have not access, so I am necessarily 
destined never to live through the presence of another to himself. And yet each 
other person does exist for me as an unchallengeable style or setting of co-
existence, and my life has a social atmosphere just as it has a 'avour of mortality 
(Merleau-Ponty, 2005: 424). 
 
The same nature that bursts presence and which “opens the world to me through” the 
perspective of body, is itself the essential contingency of life. The flesh is thus the 
very opening to a world that both transcends, but also grounds the individual to its 
body. In other words, death is neither a fundamental anxiety nor avoidable by any 
strategy. Just as social life is an essential part of existence, so too is death. Aside 
from clearly demonstrating Merleau-Ponty’s notion of death as intermingled with 
life, it also points back to the communal attitude towards death. Merleau-Ponty may 
have stumbled upon this natural attitude, in the sense of it being a monolithic 
tradition that lasted for thousands of years, in his expression of the elementariness of 
Being.  
 
Yet even the “flavor of mortality” cannot be free from the prevalent attitudes toward 
life that inform aspects of daily experience. There is a basic surrendering to death 
when it is considered as the essential source of anxiety, a shattering truth that lies at 
the core of Being, at the dramatic inner life of the infant. It overlooks other such 
essential parts of reality such as the Flesh, the intertwined existence of the human 
being with the World; such as love, which can move human beings and inform their 
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lives as much as death; and such as technology, which has tremendous effects on the 
perceptual field and imagination. In short, Being emerges as the nexus of a variety of 
perspectives, of an intermingled Visibility with the Invisible.   
 
The same surrender also follows from the objectifying look that pervades daily 
experience. In considering death as divorced from daily experience, it becomes 
unbearable to look at, ungraspable in its own term which results in the shift of 
attitudes that renders death invisible. As if its moment of disappearance is a fact of 
nature and not our making. 
 
3.4 Conclusion 
 
The contingency of existence in the World is thus reflected in the contingency of 
attitudes toward death. Even its certainty is now in doubt. It appears that technology 
is always on the verge of announcing immortality. But it is through the analytical 
mindset that one can attempt to grasp death in its certainty as if it can be reduced to a 
mathematical equation. Death can never be realized in its entirety since it is too 
integral to existence for it to be completely circumscribed by any one discourse, 
narrative or perspective. 
 
The attitudes toward death that have radically shifted alongside the scientific 
revolution and the advance of technology are given an ontological basis with 
Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenology. The field of perception is where attitudes toward 
dying and the prevalent ways of seeing the world come together. In this sense, death 
and technology can be considered within the same field, giving more proof to the 
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impact of technology on aspects fundamental to Being. Also enabling a framework 
that can consider technology together with the existential categories, with the daily 
experience of Being. Technology is thus cast as intertwined within the perceptional 
field, with the body and the flesh. 
 
The body that dies is the death of a perspective that is constantly equated with one’s 
own being. But Being exceeds even the body, subsumes it under its folds and thereby 
transcends it. The very opening of Being into a world exceedingly filled with 
presence is the very reason of its mortality. But death cannot be understood solely by 
its contingency. It is by the nature of Being this openness comes with a price. The 
flavor of mortality is nothing more than the flavor of the World. Filled with pain and 
death alongside joy and life, an attempt to reflect on death must realize these two 
aspects as belonging to the same thing: the experience of the world.  Otherwise, 
death becomes an insurmountable limit to thinking and the antithesis of life. Whereas 
Being is always a being that is born and inevitably dies. Being born and dying are the 
natural horizons for a life that admits no thought of nothingness to its folds. Only in 
the abstract and objectifying framework of 20th century death becomes the menace 
that it is. There is no essential death anxiety other than the historical facts of  
attitudes toward death. 
 
Therefore an account of death that incorporates these radical transformations in 
every sphere of culture and social life must also deal with technology and science. 
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CHAPTER 4 
 
 
TECHNOLOGY 
 
 
 
It is not that one cannot think about death. But it is the other’s death that can readily 
be understood. What is hard, or maybe even impossible, is to realize one’s own 
death, to apprehend a world without the permanence of one’s own body. For it is this 
permanent perspective that the body inhabits the world by – live the world – and 
there is no experience of another perspective, one without this body. On the other 
hand, the comings and goings of the others are ordinary. They often move into other 
rooms, out of houses, out of vision. Sometimes, even after the death of the other, we 
await their return, unable to grasp the finality of their departure. How is it possible 
that person, that living, breathing, moving body that was full of voice, that reacted to 
me, that had its own inner life, could now be totally immobile, unreactive, and 
unable to talk to me? I am here waiting for it to reappear yet it never comes. It is a 
fact that it would never come but still it is hard to come to terms with it. Something 
inside, sometime after one’s death, still awaits a kind of return. Not as a miraculous 
affair beyond the rules of the world but more as a naïve attachment to the 
permanence of the world, its seemingly unchanging structure which is nothing more 
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than the sense of being alive: we inhabit the body permanently.  Life itself is nothing 
more than this inhabitance, a bodily belongingness to the world. Life itself is the pain 
and joy; the sickness and the pleasure of the body; the possibilities offered and 
limitations imposed by the body. We live by it and we die by it. That is the factual 
core of every one of us: ‘the great equalizer’ is actually not simply death but the 
totality of our bodily Being. This is the fact of being bodies, of genders, of races, of 
having disabilities but also the shared fate of all life, of the many perspectives of 
death and of countless meetings with it. 
 
Yet it is inevitable that death is thought about somehow in spite of it being the 
domain that resists being known. Death is like a landscape with a wall that separates 
here from there, just like LeGuin describes in Earthsea. All knowledge amassed, all 
experience lived is in this side of the wall and what is beyond is simply color or 
colorlessness. Yet the wall is neither here nor there. It is a limit that belongs to both 
life and the supposed afterlife. More than it defines the afterlife, because there is 
nothing to define anyway, death defines life itself as the looming limit that is carried 
within. Being involves death and life simultaneously. 
 
4.1 Memento-Mori 
 
Although death is now made into taboo, the cloaking of death under the medical gaze 
of science or the biological definitions of expiration came gradually. In the still life 
painting of “Vanitas”, the transformation of how death is perceived is evident. In this 
tradition the subject is death as well as the soul. Just like Schopenhauer’s solution to 
the meaninglessness of existence is abstaining from the Will’s drive, the intended 
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moral message of these paintings is the renunciation of the bodily pleasures. The 
vanities, from the simple beauty of a flower to the luxuries of wealth are contrasted 
with the macabre presence of death, most commonly represented by a skull. Yet this 
is already the 17th century and the clean and almost bleached skull is relatively new 
for the tradition. 
For several centuries beginning in the late Middle Ages, European painters and 
sculptors produced numerous images and tomb effigies that attempted to juxtapose 
the death of the body and the eternal life of the soul. Artists commonly focused on 
the process of the body’s reduction to a skeleton, lavishing imaginative attention on 
its putrefaction. Death was rendered both frightening and disgusting – the body 
literally made food for worms and vermin that slithered through or crawled from 
the body’s cavities (Leppert, 1996: 57). 
 
The disgust that is evoked by these foul images is almost completely erased from the 
tradition by the introduction of new ways of seeing. The contrast between a body 
that, however disgusting, necessarily decays and returns back to nature and the 
eternal soul that escapes the fate of the body could not be sustained in the Cartesian 
understanding of the body as machine. The flesh of the body and its primal existence 
had to be forgotten and replaced with a new mode of perception, one that forgets the 
elementary kinship of the body to the Earth. 
By the seventeenth century, death was no less a matter of concern, but it had some 
competition. Modern secularization, evident in the advance of European humanism, 
focused more on the here and now, and much less on the hereafter. The ubiquitous 
realization that life was short was tempered by the argument that, at least for people 
of means, living had its mighty and increasing pleasures. Death (stilled life) as a 
visual object became at once abbreviated, abstracted, and rationalized, and rotting 
corpses disappeared from representation. Ironically, in the course of only a few 
decades the subject of death provided an excuse to deny death’s reality in the very 
moment of representing it (Leppert, 1996: 57). 
 
What was replaced is a sense of death that was vulgar and horrible to witness. In 
addition, superstitions about death did not cease to exist. But the triumph and 
credibility of science and new modes of perceiving marginalized such beliefs in the 
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advent of secularization. The industrialized city now operated to its own rhythm, its 
own specific contours, its own particular sicknesses and anxieties. It was this world 
that Hans Castorp left at the beginning of The Magic Mountain (Mann, 1969) and 
arrived at a place where time and space is different from the city. In The Magic 
Mountain (1969) Thomas Mann tells the story of the young engineer Hans Castorp, 
leaving the industrial flat lands to arrive at the International Sanatorium Berghof in 
the Alps. While his aim is at first a brief visit to his cousin Joachim Ziemssen, his 
visit first turns into months and then into years as he is also diagnosed with 
tuberculosis. However, his diagnosis is never certain, only some suspicious spots 
show up in his X-Rays. Nevertheless Castorp takes up to the “horizontal” life of the 
Sanatorium, spending hours in his lounge chair, resting and contemplating life as he 
never had in the busy life of the flat lands. His life changes into thermometer 
readings, fiery love affairs between the patients, long discussions about the virtues 
and shortcomings of enlightenment and countless hours of lying horizontal, resting. 
 
The novel discusses the core issues of modernity in the dialogues between the 
characters. Mann himself acknowledged his debt to Nietzsche’s ideas about the 
shortcomings of modernity. In fact, the pre-war society that occupies the beds of the 
sanatorium can be said to be the last instances of a kind of living that would be lost 
with the start of the First World War at the end of the novel. In this sense, Mann’s 
book captures that moment just before the war in the character of Castorp, “life’s 
delicate child”. 
 
For the purposes of this thesis, out of the many complex ideas that the novel 
discusses, medicalization is important. The patients of the sanatorium constantly 
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measure their temperatures, discuss their illnesses and are divided into sects 
according to their sicknesses. For all the centrality of illness, death is never discussed 
openly by the staff and the dying patient is segregated from the general populace of 
patients. One of the central chapters in the book, titled Snow, tells the event of 
Castorp going on a trip to the mountains and getting caught up in a blizzard and 
nearly dying. While near death, Castorp dreams a vivid landscape, full of people who 
are kind and full of love but in the end sees the horrible image of a child being eaten 
by two women, which represents the nature’s savagery. With the end of this chapter, 
Castorp arrives at one of the central ideas of the novel: “For the sake of goodness 
and love, man shall grant death no dominion over his thoughts” (Mann, 1969: 743). 
He wakes up from the dream and is able to return back and promptly forgets the 
conclusion he arrived. A brush with death can reveal some truth but that moment of 
enlightenment passes and is forgotten in the daily life. Castorp does not get lost 
simply because of his carelessness but wants to get lost in the silent, the white 
wilderness of the mountains. He pushes forward as if he could arrive at a state of 
mind; find an image offered by the untouched nature of the mountains that could 
present him with the truth. Yet the truth of love and death that he arrives at the dream 
of love and death is transitory. Mann balances the optimistic message of this idea 
with skepticism for sustaining that moment in the daily life, which was revealed in 
the savage force of nature. The sanatorium is a place of perpetual illness and 
recovery, sustained by obsessiveness in the body and its illnesses, a recluse from the 
savagery of nature. 
 
The life at the mountain is not pure and devoid of the advances of a new age. For 
example, technology impacts and confuses Castorp’s life. As Schultz (2001) points 
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out, there are two instances where Castorp meets with technology. One is the X-Ray 
and the other is gramophone. In both instances, being the impressionable fellow he 
is, Castorp is indelibly marked by these occurrences with these devices through his 
various senses. X-Ray confounds him; gramophone immerses him.  
 
The X-Ray images of Castorp’s cousin’s, his love affair Clavdia’s and his own 
skeleton immediately evokes the message of Vanitas – memento mori. However, the 
skeletal image that is anonymous in the traditional symbolism of Vanitas here carries 
significance beyond a moral lesson: the image of skeleton belongs to that person that 
is alive, that moves and speaks and is sick. While a Vanitas painting may contain 
symbolism and later as Leppert (1996) notes, increasingly excessive goods of luxury 
and pleasure to balance out the morbid subject, the X-Ray image is harder to come to 
terms with. It contains neither ornament nor a clearly coded moral message.  
 
This is a personal and terrifying encounter of a mind that is torn between the physical 
and the metaphysical. Castorp was once an engineer but later in his stay on the 
mountain becomes a student of biology. While he dabbles in these sciences, he also 
attends a séance to summon ghosts. These events point out that science is 
problematic beyond its internal mechanisms. It is problematic as technology that 
produces images and replaces old modes of perception. These new kinds of 
perceptions pave the way towards the transformation of Being, or at least new 
aspects of Being, which are still in development and along with it the transformation 
of death.  It must be noted that this new way of perception that is informed by 
science and technology is not death itself and science is not solely responsible for 
how these attitudes changed. The relation between the body and its death was 
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established long ago, in a different yet overlapping and resurfacing sense, by 
Socrates (maybe also before Socrates, in the emergence of perception infused with 
ideas and reflectivities). But the introduction of new ways of perceiving the world 
such as the X-Ray image carries significance as being one of the elements of the 
transformation of the relation with mortality. 
 
Both the anatomical charting of the body and the production of the photographic 
image of the body introduces a different perspective to the very opening of the 
human being to the world. The symbolic framework of memento mori is long 
eradicated from daily life. The sense of “flesh” in The Seventh Seal (Bergman, 1957) 
and the many images of memento mori that is displayed now belong to a different 
death, one that was ordered and maintained by the symbolism, the faith and the 
structure of religion but also faced as a community. On the other hand, the terminal 
patients in the sanatorium in The Magic Mountain (Mann, 1969) are segregated from 
the relatively healthy ones. They die lonely deaths in their rooms and are not allowed 
visits by other patients. Death is hidden from view. 
 
4.2 Cronenberg’s Cinema 
 
Aspects of life have been transformed since the last hundred years. It is a feeling, if 
not a fact, that these changes are accelerating. It may be argued that those who 
inhabit the cities and makes much use of technology continuously, are participants in 
the latest evolution of human beings’ project of dominating its planet and finally, 
controlling his fate. To that end, an enormous world has been created that is more 
and more penetrated by devices and is seen, felt and perceived yet again with the 
help of these devices but this time enhanced with information and embedded in 
  
 
63 
systems of seeing, touching and manipulating these screens, buttons, touch surfaces. 
Human beings move to live in cities that are cement and block with intermittent 
pockets of nature and pets; see and perceive designed surfaces, images and 
structures; and are thoroughly captivated by screens. These are only the last cycles of 
a transformation of attitudes, perceptions and beliefs by the scientific perspective that 
permeates some of the world views. New ways to perceive the worlds are learned 
and most of the time, these scientific truths appear as religiously dogmatic in their 
claim for objectivity. The discourses and devices that are created by science and 
technology seem to be constants of daily inhabitance in the world; they mingle with 
reality in surprising ways. In ways that cannot be foreseen and are still unprepared to 
be heard or seen as Hans Cartorp is in The Magic Mountain when he first sees the X-
Ray machine, its sounds and flashes, its unsettling mechanisms. 
 
Yet it is not the case that technology eradicates all thought in favor of one. Thinking 
itself creates many possibilities of overcoming, of criticizing itself but it also finds 
recluses, regressions and all kinds of perversions, as Ballard would say. Technology 
promotes one way of seeing the world at the expense of all other ways of seeing. 
There now opens numerous frames in the perceptual field that constantly demand 
attention. Even the systems of signification that is required to parse the information 
that pours forth through these screens is a system that have to become familiarized 
with, to be initiated into, to be included in the dialogue, to understand its language. 
 
There are numerous examples to the ways that technology changes the perception of 
the world. It is in these particular perceptions that technology is first met. These 
perceptions of certain instances of technology may preclude a conception of 
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technology in its totality. But in the bodily perception of technology there is found an 
expression of the current existence of the human being that relates him to his 
elementary belongingness to the world, within the flesh, in Merleau-Ponty’s sense of 
the term. The screens in front of those who are there to perceive them reflect back to 
them a sense of seeing the world, both in the variety of interfaces that perceived, in 
the brightly colored and high-definition openings of a certain modality of technology 
that glare, flicker and beam at the center of perception of the world. These screens 
are perceived and met with bodies, by skin and vision; by sitting and positioning the 
heads in certain fashions, writing and reading in new ways, constructing and 
attaining knowledge in certain ways. In other words, partaking in technology to such 
extents and to such depths that there is an overlapping in the bodily, primal Being 
and the new modes of perception that are offered. Just like the painter sees the world 
seeing himself and his art is an expression of this overlapping; there is and 
overlapping and belonging with technology. This is not to say that those who daily 
engage with technology are androids. Rather it means that there have to be an 
awareness of perception as revealing the world itself. In other words, the Cartesian 
understanding of representation has to be replaced by an understanding of the world 
as present to the self and as such, the ambiguity that is inherent in existence can only 
be said to have been problematized further by technology and not entirely caused by 
it. 
 
Cronenberg is one of the few artists who are able display the relation between 
technology and body; and the transformation of reality by this relation. For instance 
in The Fly, Seth Brundle transforms into Brundlefly: a monster that is both machine, 
insect and human.  
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In the course of the film he Seth starts out not being able to teleport organic matter, 
because he doesn't understand the flesh. In the course of the film, he  is 
increasingly  compelled  to  endure  the  burden  of the  materiality  that  he is 
unable  to  comprehend  or  master.  His body is traversed by physical forces, and 
submitted to stresses, that are more and more intolerable.  By the end, he is all too 
acquainted with the flesh: he is even merged with the machinery that alters him, 
with the telepod itself. This new body, this mass of mingled tissue and metal, is a 
burden too great to bear. Its sheer weight epitomizes sensory and corporeal 
overload: an overinvestment of the muscles and the nerves, a sensitivity and 
vulnerability too great to be endured, and yet that must be endured.  Seth crawls 
forth and gestures imploringly to Veronica; death is the only release from this 
relentless process, this hell of embodiment. This excruciating materiality cannot be 
redeemed, this contaminating alterity cannot be assumed or possessed. Yet it is 
precisely the untenability of this position that is most important, and most 
affirmative. To the extent that the flesh is unbearable, it is irrecuperable.  The 
extremities of agony cannot finally be distinguished from those of pleasure.  Bodily 
intensity is in this sense an other to power, an excess that disturbs it, a surplus that 
it cannot ever control or appropriate (Shaviro, 2006: 148) 
 
In addition to demonstrating the excessiveness of the flesh and its uncontrollable 
primacy, Cronenberg also shows the body’s intrinsic openness to the world. How is 
it possible that a human being can merge with a fly and a machine? The body that is 
related to the immaterial world of technology or the insects and other animals is the 
precondition for such a monstrosity as Brundlefly. The computers, the data they 
produce, the cars driven, the city lived in and the entirety of the human species are all 
enfolded within the flesh of the world. There is an elementary connectedness that at 
once leaves the self open to all kinds of transformations, often disgusting and cruel, 
monstrous. But from another perspective, precisely because body and technology is 
intertwined together in the flesh, the body cannot be contained within technology. 
The visceral aspect of the world overflows the many perspectives of it as the very 
condition of perception. Cronenberg’s cinema can be the perfect example of 
Merleau-Ponty’s philosophy in terms of its expression of the human being in his 
sheer embeddedness in the world.  
 
  
 
66 
In Videodrome, Max entangles with the screen and is transformed into a video 
machine by a wound / vaginal opening in his chest.  
Brian O’Blivion’s categorical, video-recorded pronouncements are repeated like 
mantras throughout the film: "The television screen is the retina of the mind's eye; 
therefore the television screen is part of the physical structure of the brain." When 
experience is absorbed by video technology, then this technology is itself quite 
palpably "real."…The more images are flattened out and distanced from their 
representational sources, the more they are inscribed in our nerves, and flash across 
our synapses. The real is not "lost" so much as it is redescribed in consequence of a 
radical epistemological break or shift: it is no longer what is referred to, but what 
suffers and is transformed (Shaviro, 2006: 138). 
 
The technological understanding of the self should never be so alien from that 
primordial sense of Being since it still overlaps with that bodily understanding of the 
world. This is not a metaphysical understanding nor can it be exhausted merely by 
physical description. It is rather an expression of life, be it phenomenological, visual 
or textual. This is the aspect of Being that is fleshy, material, visceral and 
Cronenberg captures it in exhilarating ways. His films express the radical 
transformation that can be traced back to the medicalized death of Ivan Ilyich, or 
even earlier, to the 17th century and the scientific revolution. 
 
 
 
4.3 Technological Transformation 
 
What was forgotten during this transformation process? Was it the primal existence 
of the human species at its earlier stages of evolution, of pure horror of nature under 
the open sky, a precarious security that threatens one’s existence all the time? Was it 
a relation with life that denied anything other than anxiety? They were scared and yet 
outside language, literally, yet they drew, they had that urge to left a mark, to express 
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something about the world. What does one see in Herzog’s The Cave of Forgotten 
Dreams, in the blood red smear of one’s own body on the wall of a secluded cave in 
France? Already painting was the dream of a mirror that one saw oneself seeing; as 
well as the drawing of an animal, of meat, of the pleasure and the comfort of that 
meat. It is the former sense of painting that Merleau-Ponty saw in Cézanne. Painting 
as a mirror, a seeing of oneself seeing, that primal order of perception that cannot 
assimilate his own seeing within different strands of thought, under language or a 
variety of filters. In the pre-historical man’s mark of his hands that he leaves on the 
dark temple of the cave one goes to that familiar, childlike and elementary perception 
of the world. Even Herzog cannot be as fatalistic as he often is and admits a sort of 
communication that is mediumless, dramatic, childlike and material all at once. In 
that sense, the contrast with the albino alligators that comes at the end of the film is 
striking. These mutant products of technological transformation of the world are now 
our marks, there to witness the world after the humans are long gone. Herzog 
believes that there will come a time on this Earth that no human will exist; no one 
will be here to perceive it. Life as the death screams of millions of species in the 
middle of a vast nothingness. And why not? For surely as all things alive, which our 
species is, so too they will die. This biological sense of thinking neatly opposes 
Schopenhauer’s thinking which attributes a brute dumbness to the daily Being of the 
human due to an inability to realize death in face of the factuality of the world. 
Equally elusive is the ability of the species to imagine a state of the world devoid of 
death anxiety. This new mark of ours, this albino alligator, is not as naïve as the 
mark of the one who, probably excitedly, touched the stones with his colored hands. 
The first sense of drawing, of writing, but mostly someone coloring the world itself. 
  
 
68 
It may be admitted that there is as much childlike naiveté in that act of marking as in 
the entirety of the bodily existence in the world.  
 
So there is nothing forgotten except the apocalyptic vision of the albino alligator. It 
is the memento mori that reappears as science fiction: from the beginning of 
civilization to the fall. The albino alligator is the strange, funny and already ghostly 
image of a decadent civilization that built strange and deadly wonders. The contrast 
of the personal significance of mark making with the manifestation of the deadly 
precision of nature is itself problematic in its duality but Herzog cannot be at fault 
for his apocalyptic vision. Apocalypse is that imminent threat of death that invades 
us thoroughly as much as our ancestors at the dawn of time. 
 
Landscapes of apocalypse invade games and films. What is a zombie but the return 
of the worm ridden, decomposing image of the dead that belonged to the earlier 
tradition of Vanitas? These images that were once so potent and later robbed of their 
dogmatic symbolism, returns again and again in different ways. The strength of the 
zombie lies in its ability to incorporate many anxieties and fears about the world. It is 
the fear of the other, those alien and incomprehensible bodies; the fear of the bodily 
death of the self; fear of nature revealed as pure agony. A vampire is also dead but it 
still carries that romantic idea of desire as distinct from body. Vampire is dead but it 
can also love, lust for the blood. Zombie on the other hand is the Schopenhauer’s 
Will in its entire monstrosity: pure mindless hunger for flesh. It is another instance of 
death personified, anonymous and repulsive. Can the fascination with the zombie be 
a fascination with death? Can it be an attempt to perceive death without admitting 
death completely? Is it another instance of death drive or simply a prelude to an 
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image of the world that is not crowded, a world that is cleansed of bullshit, of the 
trivial and the banal? Since for all the scientific narrative that is thrown at the reasons 
for the existence of zombies, the general sense of the zombie is still metaphysical. 
How can death be animated? To answer this, it must be remembered that death also 
danced in that old tradition that represented it in its terrifying and decomposing 
aspect. The procession of flagellants in The Seventh Seal is such a representation of 
death. 
 
4.3.1 Gamification and Quantification of Daily Life 
 
In what ways do humans live differently from those who have come before 
technological advances of the last century? What can this reveal?  
 
As Cartesian philosophy reduced body into machinery, the body is now reduced into 
information. Can this be considered a strategy of survival of the species? One of the 
recently revealed drives behind this project is still marginal yet seemingly plausible 
notion of existing as pure information. It follows directly from Merleau-Ponty’s 
philosophy that such an existence would resemble nothing of this world that human 
beings now inhabit since they inhabit the world with their bodies. But is not this 
already the meaning of singularity: a world that is unimaginable? Not for the first 
time in history, science needs to become metaphysical if all there is to existence can 
be summed up in code. Being, translated into ones and zeros is nothing more than a 
ridiculous reduction; yet that bigger project of escaping death is not ridiculous but 
crucial to existence.  
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Two current trends that are primarily born out of the technological perspective are 
quantification and gamification. Quantification is a fairly recent movement that is 
based on collecting data from every aspect of daily life in order to get a clearer 
picture of life. The goal here is the enhancement of life in various ways such as 
health, success and a general sense of well-being. This view of life, while it never 
proposes to be the single perfect perspective on life, is itself another instance of the 
greater emergence of technology since the last three hundred years. Putting aside the 
supposedly purely rational undertones of such a trend, one of the reasons behind this 
reduction may be as old as the human being: survival. The quantification may be 
another way of living longer, of being more successful or attaining happiness and as 
such, it betrays a deeply seated fear of life, a retreat into the realm of numbers, of 
data, of incorruptible world of forms. Just like the flesh from the skeleton disappears 
to reveal only the abstracted, symbolic skull - the head, the seat of rationality, an 
empty throne - the daily life is being abstracted into infographics, into immense 
storages of data and into an entire way of life that is infused by information.  
 
Gamification is another trend that may be considered as a moment in the 
transformation of daily life. The reason behind this is to enhance certain services, 
such as the tools of social media, with a system of gaming that offers a playful 
experience. The medium of games must be considered as distinct from this trend 
since gamification mostly employs a fairly narrow and boring sense of gaming which 
is that of simple point collecting and achievement oriented systems. Here again a 
simple minded visualization and reduction of life, as well as games, is evident.  
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Both trends must be considered as containing within them more than just the 
technological perspective. They also have an existential and caring attitude towards 
life. Yet they are, in their current form, also are not entirely distinct when considered 
within the history of technology and its impact on existence, particularly the ubiquity 
of technological / scientific outlook. This is not to say that both can express 
something deeper about life, offer new ways of seeing that would be enriching. 
Games especially are already capable of such expression with a growing awareness 
of both the shortcomings and strengths of the medium. In other words, games are art 
in the sense of expressing the world by relating to that instinct of playing which is 
also commonly observed in the life of the animal.  
 
It is also no wonder that death and dying is part and parcel in games. From gruesome 
to cute, death and war maybe the single greatest aspect of gaming. They are not that 
far away from the attitudes toward death and the great escape from mortality.  
 
4.3.2 The Screens 
 
Aside from their connection to other forms of expression, the sheer numbers of 
screens makes them distinct from other frames that came before them. They require 
attention in certain ways; they enforce certain perspectives that are distinct from 
natural perspectives. In this sense, the flatness of screens is crucial. For “…the lived 
experience is not flat, without depth, without dimension, it is not an opaque stratum 
with which we would have to merge” (Merleau-Ponty, 1968: 124). 
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Can screens be considered as depthless? A screen is, in one sense, definitely an 
object with depth. It sits atop desks, inside pockets, hangs on walls. It occupies space 
and itself has color and dimensions. You can view it from multiple perspectives, go 
around it or touch it. Yet the screen, in its mechanical sense, is not a complete screen 
unless it shows something. It is a screen insofar it is an opening, a bright frame that 
can broadcast all images that can be produced by humans. In this sense, it holds near 
infinite possibilities. 
 
Yet the images on screens are in another sense different from the objects outside 
them. They surely refer to the outside objects, they are in many ways related to them, 
yet they lack the depth, the weight of the objects. What is different here is a narrower 
bodily relation with the images on screen compared to the relation with the objects of 
the world. This narrowness has everything to do with the bodily constraints that 
screens impose. A screen reveals itself only in certain perspectives due to its flatness, 
thus closing off other virtual perspectives that body can in relation occupy. 
 
It may be argued here that painting also is a flat image. It too cannot be looked at 
from other perspectives. For instance, just like a screen, you cannot see a painting 
from behind whereas a rock, a tree or a mountain can be seen from multiple 
perspectives. Merleau-Ponty’s (2007: 75) thoughts about Cézanne is revealing in this 
point: 
Cézanne does not try to use color to suggest the tactile sensations which would give 
form and depth. These distinctions between touch and sight are unknown in 
primordial perception. It is only as a result of a science of the human body that we 
&nally learn to distinguish between our senses. The lived object is not rediscovered 
or constructed on the basis of the data of the senses; rather, it presents itself to us 
from the start as the center from which the data radiate. We see the depth, the 
smoothness, the softness, the hardness of objects; Cézanne even claimed that we 
see their odor. If the painter wants to express the world, the arrangement of his 
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colors must bear within this arrangement this indivisible Whole, or else his painting 
will only be an allusion to the things and will not give them in the imperious unity, 
the presence, the insurpassable fullness which is for us the de&nition of the real. 
 
The strength of painting lies in its expression of perception as the artist’s bodily 
intertwining with the totality of Being, the experience of daily life, and the base 
perception of the world. What Cézanne teaches us with the brush of his strokes is our 
base existence in the flesh. In one sense, it can argued that what is seen with the 
screens cannot present this primal overlapping with the world because perception of 
the screen is continuously disrupted by an interface, by an endless stream of 
information that engulfs the image. 
 
Is not Cézanne’s painting or even a Vanitas already a part of perception? In other 
words, does not a painting present itself to the eyes, be it a cave painting of an 
animal or a skull painting of Cézanne? In this sense, does not a screen present itself 
already if it is to be seen? Can one be not intertwined with a screen as much as he is 
with a tree? These questions disappear when Merleau-Ponty’s remarks are 
considered, that Cézanne tries to attain particularly the primal perception that is 
radically different from the scientific perspective on human body, the ugly influence 
of Cartesian philosophy. The primal presentation of the painting to the viewer, made 
possible with the active perception of the viewer, is what enables Cézanne to express 
that unity of body and the world.  
 
When Cronenberg shows Max in Videodrome, kissing the lips of Nicki Brand, he 
draws his inspiration from that same sense of the fleshiness of the world. 
Technology’s penetration of body, an image so prominent in his cinema, is possible 
because the body and the material world, but also the invisible world of symbols can 
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exist in the same brush stroke, or the video recording. It is this sense of the relation 
with screens that limits the perception of the world while also opening the way 
forward for unique experiences. The simple act of looking at screens is able to 
transform the experience of the world. This is not a surprising assertion when the 
world that emerges is considered as it is actively perceived in an overlapping relation 
of seeing and being, touching and being touched, in a unity of perception.  That is 
why the TV screen throbs and bulges just like flesh. What is surprising is not only 
the surreal and terrifying image of a fleshy screen but the active engagement of Max 
with this monstrosity. Cronenberg is able to transform this funny and disgusting 
event into a deeply fascinating and even sexual expression of technology’s impact on 
Being. 
 
It is the body and it alone, because it is a two-dimensional being that can bring us 
to the things themselves, which are themselves not 'at beings but beings in depth, 
inaccessible to a subject that would survey them from above, open to him alone 
that, if it be possible, would coexist with them in the same world. When we speak 
of the 'esh of the visible, we do not mean to do anthropology, to describe a world 
covered over with all our own projections, leaving aside what it can be under the 
human mask. Rather, we mean that carnal being, as a being of depths, of several 
leaves or several faces, a being in latency, and a presentation of a certain absence, 
is a prototype of Being, of which our body, the sensible sentient, is a very 
remarkable variant, but whose constitutive paradox already lies in every visible 
(Merleau-Ponty, 2007: 397) 
 
The paradox of visibility should not be understood in a negative way because it is the 
very opening of the Being into a world, the very site of human being’s belonging 
with the flesh. As such, the paradox of visibility that is generated by computers, by 
their insistent occupation of the world as fields of images, cannot be carried on to an 
altogether pessimistic conclusion. These fields of images that are historically 
informed by scientific and technological undercurrents, as with all human 
expression, holds the potential to overcome the limitations that are imposed on them 
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by being realized as what they are, as only instances of a general tendency to 
transform the world into a rational, discrete and at the end controllable whole 
through the reduction of all ways of seeing the world into one single perspective. 
This is not to say that there is a state of art that have overcome all limitations, as if 
there can be an end to expression or to perception. To await such awareness is to 
forget the central limitation of human existence: the body. Yet there is, as always, a 
possibility of transformation as long as there is death, the ultimate transformation of 
body, its final return to nature. 
 
4.4 The Death of the Flesh Reconsidered 
 
Let us once more return to the traditional message of memento-mori. When Crusader 
admits that his flesh is afraid, he is not simply guilty of a dualistic ontology. His 
words may sound alien because he acknowledges the flesh and its decomposition 
rather than reducing it to its anatomical mechanism or dismissing it as unthinkable. 
Bergman personifies death and by virtue of this anthropomorphism invites death to 
the social world, amongst the people, the community, to a game of chess between 
two people, thus infusing the film with a sense of hope. The moral message of 
memento mori remains intact in the Bergman’s cinema, proving the adaptability of 
the traditional attitudes toward death into other mediums. Thus it may be argued that 
although the Vanitas tradition and the symbolic framework that it operated within 
may have been forgotten, the message that it conveys resonates still: remember 
death.  
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Even with the symbolism of Vanitas erased, even with the dead, dying and the 
terminal patient pushed out of daily life and community, even with technology 
promising freedom from pain and a prolonged life-span, death returns. It returns as 
monstrosities, transformed by some metaphysical scientific process; it returns as 
zombies, decaying and limping and moaning with hunger; it returns as all the little 
adjustments that are made throughout the daily experience of the world, with the goal 
of escaping from facing its visceral components; it returns as war, murder, blood, 
gore and violence that pours forth through the screens. Simply put, the invisibility of 
death is just a vanishing act, an illusion. As with all illusions, something real is 
always revealed at the end of the chain of concealments and trickeries. Death cannot 
be get rid of even if it is hidden completely out of view and kicked out of the daily 
life. It finds ways of return. What this implies is that death is only distorted and not 
completely invisible. As Merleau-Ponty (1968: 150) argues, as all such ideas, death 
is known by all, yet at the moment of definition disappears:  
Each time we want to get at it immediately, or lay hands on it, or circumscribe it, or 
see it unveiled, we do in fact feel that the attempt is misconceived, that it retreats in 
the measure that we approach. The explicitation [sic] does not give us the idea 
itself; it is but a second version of it, a more manageable derivative. 
 
It may also be argued that primal existence in the world, the intertwinement with 
flesh is itself the origin of a certain kind of awareness of death. Death is perceived 
even if it is through a screen; or as an absence in the family or a pet dying. Yet the 
available attitudes that one can assume towards it, a common concealment and 
obstruction of death or the fervent attempt to stay young and stave off death, 
precludes a real relationship to develop with one’s own mortality. 
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The transformation of attitudes toward bodies by technology is one of the most 
important elements that go side by side with the changing attitudes toward death. 
There is no flesh in the sense that the Crusader considers his body to be. There is 
however still the flesh of the world that human beings inhabit and are united with at 
the core of their being. This flesh may be considered as the monstrous and 
fascinating flesh of Cronenberg, one that is gradually penetrated by technology but 
still retains its deep radical “alterity”7 along with its familiarity. The death of the 
flesh reappears in radical new formulations and each formulation seems to be more 
and more technological in its make-up. 
 
4.5 Conclusion 
 
The question is then how can one redevelop and capture that relation with death and 
the world again? Merleau-Ponty’s philosophy points to a possible transformation that 
aims at reestablishing the world as present to self.  
 
In this reconfigured sense of the world, death itself must reappear as present to 
oneself. In order to achieve this, the Cartesian understanding of perception has to be 
purged and replaced with a return to the actuality of the fullness of senses. 
Perception of the world has to be the field of discovery of one’s own mortality rather 
than scientific observation, technologically / scientifically ordered vision or a 
religious surrender to a single perspective of the world. By situating body as the 
nexus of Being, Merleau-Ponty brings the actual experience of the self, the world of 
daily life, into the forefront. The merit of his philosophy is the overcoming of the 
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duality that is inherent in thought and which results in false notions about life as it is 
lived. By focusing the discussion on seeing, Merleau-Ponty transforms the awareness 
of what is seen into a process that reveals perception in action. More than that, the 
body is revealed as elementarily connected with the world, pointing the way to a 
primal sense of Being that informs all life. 
 
While technology occupies more and more of daily life, the body retains its 
resistance, its well of carnal powers and desires. It is the great failure of science that 
the body still has to die so it is kept secret, hidden from view. In other words, 
technological and scientific way of looking at the world merely obscures the relation 
of body with death. What results is a distorted and abstract perception of death that is 
depthless, flat and devoid of flesh, like the bleached and anatomical depiction of 
skull in late Vanitas. Death becomes something to be avoided when science becomes 
the tyrant of perception. Between the extreme positions of suicide and denial of 
death, all shades in between are being erased. There remains no possibility of 
incorporating death into the folds of life, which it already is anyway. Thus death 
becomes the great nothingness where in fact it is present in the flesh. 
 
The flesh screams when it becomes aware of great danger. There lies dormant, not so 
deep down, the animal, the instinct of the species, and the life of the body that cannot 
be defined or delineated by any science. For all those years of civilization, that dark 
hunger, that primal flow of life can still not be controlled. With the spark of danger, 
with a meeting with death, a transformation can be ignited or that chance too may be 
passed over. This is not to say that the only possible way of thinking to counter the 
technological thinking has to give primacy to death. On the contrary, by only 
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considering death as intertwined within the flesh, can the entirety of Being be 
brought to view. Not to be understood, but to be expressed and better, to be lived. 
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CHAPTER 5 
 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
 
 
The answer may still be hidden in the woods, in the mountains, in the depths of the 
oceans, in the hearts of exploding galaxies, in the recesses of bodies. Truth is such an 
ambiguous thing that it may already be blooming in the very source of this 
ambiguousness, inside the folds of Earth itself. The question to this answer is not 
“What is death?” or “Why is there death?” or even “Why do I have to die?” Rather it 
is the oldest one asked, the question that can only be asked by a human: “How can I 
face death without surrendering to it?” 
 
Escaping death often results in abandoning life. And escaping life is itself 
surrendering to death. But the game has to be played even in the face of certain loss. 
What is the difference of winning or losing compared to all life that have come 
before and perished without a memory left intact? Yet it is one of the redeeming 
aspects of life that death is fought with teeth and nails.  
 
Science has been weaponized in this fight, not because of any fault in itself, but 
because of a tendency to refrain from life in fear of death. Scientific and 
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technological advances have greatly increased the quality of life and the quantity of 
life-spans yet this has come at a cost: an obstruction of human life from its primal 
essence. In itself, no device of technology is able to completely make the human into 
a machine or entirely erase his bodily connection to life. But the totality of 
technology, the environment of the city and the ubiquity of screens in the 
perceptional field have transformed aspects of Being by sacrificing the plurality of 
perspectives at the altar of progress and the project of immortality. 
 
As can be witnessed in Cronenberg’s cinema, there are paths of resistance, sites of 
transgression that betrays the success of this murder. Bodies open up to technology 
without prejudice and the resulting forms of perception are unpredictable, monstrous 
and holds potential beyond imagining. The flesh, the elementariness of the world 
overlaps with technology and bodies, enfolding both in a field of perception that 
gives rise to new kinds of seeing the world, new ways of Being. 
 
Aside from these new, technologically informed experiences, there exists another 
path, one that may be better suited in the personal quest of facing death. Although it 
is a rather sentimental thought, nature presents alternatives to technological thought. 
This does not mean however, that technology and nature are opposed to each other in 
a simplistic duality. Rather as one must be aware of his life as a life that opens up to 
screens, to computers and to cities, one must also be aware that there exist trees and 
stars that can and does tell something about life, however unaccustomed most human 
beings have become to listening them. Hesse (1972) beautifully captures this 
alternative way of thinking: “Trees are sanctuaries. Whoever knows how to speak to 
them, whoever knows how to listen to them, can learn the truth. They do not preach 
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learning and precepts, they preach, undeterred by particulars, the ancient law of life”. 
The law of life is the law of death. Or rather, law of life was always the law of death 
and only later cut in half, to leave out the sick, terrifying, painful aspect, and failing 
terribly. 
A longing to wander tears my heart when I hear trees rustling in the wind at 
evening. If one listens to them silently for a long time, this longing reveals its 
kernel, its meaning. It is not so much a matter of escaping from one’s suffering, 
though it may seem to be so. It is a longing for home, for a memory of the mother, 
for new metaphors for life. It leads home. Every path leads homeward, every step is 
birth, every step is death, every grave is mother. 
 
So the tree rustles in the evening, when we stand uneasy before our own childish 
thoughts: Trees have long thoughts, long-breathing and restful, just as they have 
longer lives than ours. They are wiser than we are, as long as we do not listen to 
them. But when we have learned how to listen to trees, then the brevity and the 
quickness and the childlike hastiness of our thoughts achieve an incomparable joy. 
Whoever has learned how to listen to trees no longer wants to be a tree. He wants 
to be nothing except what he is. That is home. That is happiness (Hesse, 1972). 
 
Trees offer new metaphors of life. These new metaphors are not shortcuts for 
alleviating anxiety or seclusions from life. Rather it is a return to a state of mind that 
harmonizes life and death in perception, that is aware of life not as contained within 
the brain, or some biological system but as an active inhabitance of a universe that 
always offers a way “home”. There is nothing alien and other in a tree, nor are we 
strangers stranded on a planet. The elementary belongingness of the human life to 
universe is revealed in the thoughts of trees if one can listen to them. 
 
However, it is already hard for the city dweller to have such an experience. The 
painting, if Merleau-Ponty and Cezanne are agreed with, offers expression of such 
perception, but can it replace actually being in a forest? 
I'd never imagined that trees could be so weird and unearthly. I mean, the only 
plants I've ever really seen or touched till now are the city kind--neatly trimmed 
and cared-for bushes and trees. But the ones here--the ones living here--are totally 
different. They have a physical power, their breath grazing any humans who might 
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chance by, their gaze zeroing in on the intruder like they've spotted their prey. Like 
they have some dark, prehistoric, magical powers. Like deep-sea creatures rule the 
ocean depths, in the forest trees reign supreme. If it wanted to, the forest could 
reject me--or swallow me up whole (Murakami, 2006: 124). 
 
Actual perception of the forest also reveals its strange power. Murakami’s textual 
expression reveals the uneasiness one feels when he enters into a world that is 
radically different than his own. The city dweller is scared to be in the presence of 
life in all its strangeness. What is strange may be the reaction itself. How far have we 
come to forget and be scared of trees? Or rather, what activates within oneself when 
one ventures into to the forest that something magical, prehistoric awakens? Also 
forgotten are the stars, faded by millions of lights that are used to drown out 
darkness. 
After a simple dinner I go out on the porch and gaze up at the stars twinkling 
above, the random scattering of millions of stars. Even in a planetarium you 
wouldn't find this many. Some of them look really big and distinct, like if you 
reached your hand out intently you could touch them. The whole thing is 
breathtaking. Not just beautiful, though--the stars are like the trees in the forest, 
alive and breathing. And they're watching me. What I've done up till now, what I'm 
going to do--they know it all. Nothing gets past their watchful eyes. As I sit there 
under the shining night sky, again a violent fear takes hold of me. My heart's 
pounding a mile a minute, and I can barely breathe. All these millions of stars 
looking down on me, and I've never given them more than a passing thought 
before. Not just stars--how many other things haven't I noticed in the world, things 
I know nothing about? I suddenly feel helpless, completely powerless (Murakami 
2006: 124). 
 
The powerlessness that one can feel in the face of nature betrays a hint of the hubris 
that raises its ugly head in the attempted technological dominance of bodies, of 
nature. Encounters with uncontrolled, untame nature troubles and scares. Even if all 
one gets is a sense of tranquility, these pockets of time and space are visited briefly, 
followed by the return to the city. The experience is thus submerged under the 
greater rift of city life, that all so familiar rhythm and space quickly replacing that 
brief encounter’s uneasiness with more distractions. We have now become so 
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accustomed to seeing the world in one rationally ordered configuration, that the vast 
nothingness of the stars, the excessiveness of universe and the strange power of life 
can sometimes be troubling. Worse, the forest and the stars are mute and nothing 
transpires in that peculiar perception. It may create anxiety not just because of a 
feeling of insignificance in the face of the vastness of the universe, but also because 
such encounters reveals our kinship to something strange and alien, but also 
somehow familiar and real. What is this but the fate of all life, of flesh and blood, of 
forest and supernova, of quarks spinning and super-strings vibrating, of cloud and 
rain, of earth and fear? 
 
The albino alligators at the end of The Cave of Forgotten Dreams belong to another 
vision of the apocalypse, one that foregoes the ruins of cities and a small community 
that faces constant mortal danger. Instead Herzog imagines a landscape that lies in a 
later future: one that is repopulated by animal life, a return of the lizards of the 
Triassic period, due to global warming or another such catastrophe of our own 
making. The albino alligator could easily be transported to the post-apocalyptic 
world of Ballard in The Drowned World where the Earth recesses back to prehistoric 
times of cold blooded animals that are able to withstand the new climate. Aside from 
this contrary image of post-apocalyptic landscape, the unique position of Ballard is 
that as the world regresses, so does the existence of the human regresses along with 
the world. As such, the landscape becomes a reconfiguration of life beyond 
recognition yet still made vivid by the textual expression of Ballard. How to relate to 
that jungle-world yet still exist in this apartment, now, in this body? Ballard implies 
that the technological transformation of the world is never complete is constantly 
pregnant to new kinds of perception, new ways of Being. Human beings are merely 
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at the death throes of an ancient world that is pregnant to a future that is already 
mingled with the past and the present. The continuities with lizard life and the jungle 
in Ballard, the transgressions of media devices with the body in Cronenberg, or even 
the stark contrast with the expression of pre-historic human being with the 
emergence of new creatures that silently witness the destruction heaved by human 
beings all point to intertwinings between the material and the immaterial, the future 
and the past, the ambiguity of senses and the objectivity of science, all swirling 
through our lives around the nexus of bodies dead, bodies moving, bodies seeing 
bodies reclined in various positions, bodies at the throes of pleasure and boredom. It 
is now obvious that apocalypse itself is another expression of human beings that try 
to make sense of the world and their maddeningly unrealizable position in the 
universe. Human being perceives death in all aspects of the world mingled with life 
and surely despairs, never knowing what exactly he wishes for or what exactly he is 
afraid of, oftentimes forgetting his primal continuity with the world. 
 
Death in this sense is at once familiar and alien. It is part of the body but also part of 
the greater unity of Being. Death resides in the folds of the flesh as well as in the 
screens of computers. What must be reclaimed is a sense of death that is present. 
Present in the body but also in the life of the community. What must be reclaimed is 
a truthful admittance of death’s presence, into the life of the individual but also into 
the life of the community, and what is necessary is a chance to look. To look with 
deep fear, but with a spirit that refuses to surrender to death at every step of the way, 
that embraces life with all its ugliness and beauty, that considers death as an aspect 
of the flesh and flesh as the enveloping folds of life, and with chance, with a little 
smile that acknowledges and appreciates the absurdity and ambiguity of it: the death 
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of a person, a subject, an individual who had the heart to look at stars and 
comprehend the universe in all its vastness, who dreamt beautiful landscapes and the 
ravaging destruction of apocalypse, who played with all his might and ran with all 
his speed, who moved gracefully, who endured pain and suffering, who killed, 
murdered, gave life, breathed lungfuls of air and opened his eyes to everything, who 
searched for things amidst the great ocean of objects, who believed in things, who 
perceived reality while also denying it, who expressed himself in every move of his 
muscles, who sought pleasure every chance he had, who loved however pathetically, 
however in vain but loved anyway. 
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